British Ways Of Counter Insurgency

This edited collection examines the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency. It brings together and consolidates new scholarship on the counter-insurgency associated with the end of empire, foregrounding a dark and violent history of British imperial rule, one that stretched back to the nineteenth century and continued until the final collapse of the British Empire in the 1960s. The essays gathered in the collection cover the period from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s; they are both empirical and conceptual in tone. This edited collection pivots on the theme of the nature of the force used by Britain against colonial insurgents. It argues that the violence employed by British security forces in counter-insurgency to maintain imperial rule is best seen from a maximal perspective, contra traditional arguments that the British used minimum force to defeat colonial rebellions. Case studies are drawn from across the British Empire, covering a period of some hundred years, but they concentrate on the savage wars of decolonisation after 1945. The collection includes a historiographical essay and one on the ‘lost’ Hanslope archive by the scholar chosen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to manage the release of the papers held. This book was published as a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies.

In this seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice, David French challenges our understanding that in the two decades after 1945 the British discovered a kinder and gentler way of waging war amongst the people.

British Counterinsurgency challenges the British Army's claim to counterinsurgency expertise. It provides well-written, accessible and up-to-date accounts of the post-1945 campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar, Northern Ireland and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This text covers the development of British counterinsurgency principles and practices since 1960. Through the study of conflicts in Borneo, South Arabia, Oman and Northern Ireland, the author explores how Britain's unique approach to internal conflict evolved and shows how the conflicts of this era can only be fully understood by stressing the links between colonial and post-colonial policy.

This timely and critical volume questions the effectiveness of Britain's 'hearts and minds' approach, challenging conventional counterinsurgency thinking by drawing on the expertise of regional and thematic specialists.

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.