Strategy And Tactics Of The Salvadoran Fmln Guerrillas

This book examines the military organization, strategy, and tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas during their efforts to overthrow the government. It is largely based on the authors' personal collections of guerrilla documents captured in the war, interviews with former and captured guerrillas, and personal combat experience during one of the fiercest wars fought in the Western hemisphere in the 20th century. The book describes the guerrilla tactics from a technical point of view, and their evolution during the war in El Salvador. It includes discussions of such tactical concepts as concentration and deconcentration, urban combat, anti-air defense, the use of mines, and homemade weapons. It contains a chapter on the FMLN special forces—they were responsible for most of the spectacular attacks of the war—and it examines the sophisticated logistical system of the FMLN that made the prolonged war possible. Wherever possible, these concepts are illustrated by actual combat experiences from sources on both sides of the conflict. An important text for all concerned with guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Latin Americanists and students of the developing world will also find much of interest.

This book examines the military organization, strategy, and tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas during their efforts to overthrow the government. It is largely based on the authors' personal collections of guerrilla documents captured in the war, interviews with former and captured guerrillas, and personal combat experience during one of the fiercest wars fought in the Western hemisphere in the 20th century. The book describes the guerrilla tactics from a technical point of view, and their evolution during the war in El Salvador. It includes discussions of such tactical concepts as concentration and deconcentration, urban combat, anti-air defense, the use of mines, and homemade weapons. It contains a chapter on the FMLN special forces—they were responsible for most of the spectacular attacks of the war—and it examines the sophisticated logistical system of the FMLN that made the prolonged war possible. Wherever possible, these concepts are illustrated by actual combat experiences from sources on both sides of the conflict. An important text for all concerned with guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Latin Americanists and students of the developing world will also find much of interest.

Spencer provides a history of the FMLN guerrilla special forces—known collectively by the acronym FES—in El Salvador. Trained in Cuba and Vietnam and utilizing techniques taken from the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army, the FES terrorized the armed forces of El Salvador from 1981 to 1992. After reviewing their training, Spencer examines the major operations of the special forces and gives an in-depth discussion of their tactics and methods. He concludes with a look at the special forces groups in other Latin American countries. After reviewing their training, Spencer looks at the major operations of the special forces groups of three of the guerrilla factions—the FPL, ERP, and FAL—and provides an in-depth discussion of their major operation tactics and methods. He concludes with a look at the special forces groups in Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Puerto Rico. This thorough examination of an often misunderstood approach to guerrilla warfare will be of great interest to researchers involved with contemporary low-intensity warfare and Latin American affairs.

Dr. Steven Metz argues that the way the Department of Defense and U.S. military spend the time when counterinsurgency support is not an important part of American national security strategy determines how quickly and easily they react when policymakers commit the nation to such activity. If analysis and debate continues, at least at a low level, the military is better prepared for the reconstitution of capabilities. If it ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

This book, continuing the narrative begun by the author in two preceding volumes, provides a clear description of military combat occurring in Latin America for the years from 1982 into mid-2013. Although the text concentrates on combat operations, matters of politics, business and international relations appear as necessary to understand the wars. The author has uncovered many previously unknown sources to provide new information never published before. The book traces the many insurgencies in Latin America as well as conventional wars. Among the highlights are the chapters on the Falklands War and the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama. One useful aspect of the text is an explanation of why, of the many insurgencies appearing in Latin America, only those in Cuba and Nicaragua were successful in overthrowing governments. The book also helps explain why even unsuccessful insurgencies have survived for decades, as has happened in Colombia and Peru. Instructors considering this book for use in a course may request an examination copy here.

A new aspect of low-intensity conflict can be seen today in El Salvador, where the decade-long insurgency appears able to continue without aid from traditional sources in Cuba and East Europe. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) made its debut in 1980, but not before a private support network was established in the U.S. and other western countries to provide funds and political support for its struggle to overthrow the Salvadoran government. The FMLN is the most sophisticated guerrilla force in Latin American history. Raising millions of dollars, the FMLN relies on a well-oiled propaganda machine run by American supporters to pressure Congress to weaken the Salvadoran government. Utilizing front groups, churches, and public figures, the FMLN's private network has stymied policymakers in Washington and San Salvador. This book illuminates this new dimension of low-intensity conflict that will confound the U.S. and its allies in the decade to come.