The Theory Of The Firm

Includes over 60 classic papers, these volumes collect together contributions on the theory of the firm, beginning with Ronald Coase's classic work of 1937 and ending with important papers published as late as 1998.

The Theory of the Firm presents an innovative general analysis of the economics of the firm.

Provides a survey of the intellectual tradition founded by Ronald Coase and his 1937 publication The Nature of the Firm, a revolutionary analysis which essentially created a new paradigm in economic thinking. The 36 selected articles included in this volume are divided into six sections: the nature of the firm; organization and hierarchy; vertical integration; competence, flexibility, and growth; inter-firm cooperation and networking; and historical perspectives. All contributions selected have been previously published in journals and other publications, some as long ago as during the early 1930s. Lacks a subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Firms are a ubiquitous feature of the economic landscape, with much of the activity undertaken within an economy taking place within their boundaries. Given the size of the contribution made by firms to economic activity, employment and growth, having a theoretical understanding of the nature and structure of firms is crucial for understanding how an economy functions. The Theory of the Firm firstly offers a brief overview of the past, consisting of a concise discussion of the classical view of production, followed by an outline of the development of the neoclassical - or ‘textbook’ - approach to firm level production. Secondly, the ‘present’ of the theory of the firm is discussed in three sections. The first section considers the post-1970 theory of the firm literature per se, while the second section scrutinises the relationship between the three most prominent of the modern sets of theories: the reference point, property rights and transaction cost approaches. The third section looks at the theory of privatisation. The unique aspects of this book includes its discussions of the post-1970 contributions to the theory of the firm; the integration of the theory of the entrepreneur with the theory of the firm; and the theory of privatisation. This volume offers an intuitive introduction to the theories of the firm as well as simple formal models of the most important contributions to the literature. It also outlines the historical evolution of the traditional and modern theories of the firm. This book is of great interest to those who study history of economic thought, industrial economics and organizational studies.

The theory of the firm has been fertile ground for economists. Bylund proposes a new theory, rooted in Austrian economics, which examines the firm as a part of the market, and not as a free-standing entity. In this integrated view, a theory is offered which incorporates entrepreneurship, production, market process and economic development.

This original, provocative work makes a thorough and comprehensive enquiry into the relationship that exists between firms and markets, with separate, in-depth examinations of both the existence and inner organisation of the firm. Sautet develops an accomplished and convincing theory that encompasses a wealth of existing literature and leads it in an entirely new direction.

This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value. Assigning control to any other group would be tantamount to allowing that group to play poker with someone else's money, and would create inefficiencies. The implicit denial of this proposition is the fallacy of the so-called stakeholder theory of the corporation, which argues that corporations should be run in the interests of all stakeholders. This theory offers no account of how conflicts between different stakeholders are to be resolved, and gives managers no principle on which to base decisions, except to follow their own preferences. In practice, shareholders delegate their control rights to a board of directors, who hire, fire, and set the compensation of the chief officers of the firm. However, because agents have different incentives than the principals they represent, they can destroy corporate value unless closely monitored. This happened in the 1960s and led to hostile takeovers in the market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that the takeover movement generated increases in corporate efficiency that exceeded $1.5 trillion and helped to lay the foundation for the great economic boom of the 1990s.