A Law Of Peoples For Recognizing States

Which political entities should the international community recognize as member states—granting them the rights and powers of statehood and entitling them to participate in formulating, adjudicating, and implementing international law? What criteria should it use, and are those criteria defensible? From Kosovo, Palestine, and Taiwan to South Sudan, Scotland, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Catalonia, these questions continuously arise and constantly challenge the international community for a consistent, principled stance. In response to this challenge, Chris Naticchia offers a social contract argument for a theory of international recognition—a normative theory of the criteria that states and international bodies should use to recognize political entities as member states of the international community. Regardless of whether political entities adequately respect human rights or practice democracy, he argues, we must recognize a critical mass of them to get international institutions working. Then we should recognize secessionist entities that suffer from persistent, grave, and widespread human rights abuses by their government—and, under certain conditions, minority nations within multinational states that seek independence. We must also recognize entities whose recognition would contribute to the economic development of the least well-off entities. Drawing on the social contract tradition, and developing a broadly Rawlsian view, A Law of Peoples for Recognizing States will both challenge and appeal to a broad readership in political philosophy, international law, and international relations.

This book consists of two parts: “The Law of Peoples,” a major reworking of a much shorter article by the same name published in 1993, and the essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” first published in 1997. Taken together, they are the culmination of more than fifty years of reflection on liberalism and on some of the most pressing problems of our times by John Rawls. “The Law of Peoples” extends the idea of a social contract to the Society of Peoples and lays out the general principles that can and should be accepted by both liberal and non-liberal societies as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one another. In particular, it draws a crucial distinction between basic human rights and the rights of each citizen of a liberal constitutional democracy. It explores the terms under which such a society may appropriately wage war against an “outlaw society” and discusses the moral grounds for rendering assistance to non-liberal societies burdened by unfavorable political and economic conditions. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” explains why the constraints of public reason, a concept first discussed in Political Liberalism (1993), are ones that holders of both religious and non-religious comprehensive views can reasonably endorse. It is Rawls’s most detailed account of how a modern constitutional democracy, based on a liberal political conception, could and would be viewed as legitimate by reasonable citizens who on religious, philosophical, or moral grounds do not themselves accept a liberal comprehensive doctrine—such as that of Kant, or Mill, or Rawls’s own “Justice as Fairness,” presented in A Theory of Justice (1971).

This work consists of two parts: The Idea of Public Reason Revisited and The Law of Peoples. Taken together, they are the culmination of more than 50 years of reflection on liberalism and on some pressing problems of our times.

Analysing how Indigenous Peoples come to be identifiable as bearers of human rights, this book considers how individuals and communities claim the right of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as Indigenous peoples. The basic notion of FPIC is that states should seek Indigenous peoples’ consent before taking actions that will have an impact on them, their territories or their livelihoods. FPIC is an important development for Indigenous peoples, their advocates and supporters because one might assume that, where states recognize it, Indigenous peoples will have the ability to control how non-Indigenous laws and actions will affect them. But who exactly are the Indigenous peoples that are the subjects of this discourse? This book argues that the subject status of Indigenous peoples emerged out of international law in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Then, through a series of case studies, it considers how self-identifying Indigenous peoples, scholars, UN institutions and non-government organizations (NGOs) dispersed that subject-status and associated rights discourse through international and national legal contexts. It shows that those who claim international human rights as Indigenous peoples performatively become identifiable subjects of international law – but further demonstrates that this does not, however, provide them with control over, or emancipation from, a state-based legal system. Maintaining that the discourse on Indigenous peoples and international law itself needs to be theoretically and critically re-appraised, this book problematises the subject-status of those who claim Indigenous peoples’ rights and the role of scholars, institutions, NGOs and others in producing that subject-status. Squarely addressing the limitations of international human rights law, it nevertheless goes on to provide a conceptual framework for rethinking the promise and power of Indigenous peoples’ rights. Original and sophisticated, the book will appeal to scholars, activists and lawyers involved with indigenous rights, as well as those with more general interests in the operation of international law.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

John Rawls is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and his work has permanently shaped the nature and terms of moral and political philosophy, deploying a robust and specialized vocabulary that reaches beyond philosophy to political science, economics, sociology, and law. This volume is a complete and accessible guide to Rawls' vocabulary, with over 200 alphabetical encyclopaedic entries written by the world's leading Rawls scholars. From 'basic structure' to 'burdened society', from 'Sidgwick' to 'strains of commitment', and from 'Nash point' to 'natural duties', the volume covers the entirety of Rawls' central ideas and terminology, with illuminating detail and careful cross-referencing. It will be an essential resource for students and scholars of Rawls, as well as for other readers in political philosophy, ethics, political science, sociology, international relations and law.

This volume examines Rawls's theory of international justice as worked out in his controversial last book, The Law of Peoples.

This book continues and revises the ideas of justice as fairness that John Rawls presented in A Theory of Justice but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. That previous work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable and relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs and in which there is broad agreement about what constitutes the good life. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines—religious, philosophical, and moral—coexist within the framework of democratic institutions. Recognizing this as a permanent condition of democracy, Rawls asks how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens can live in concord when divided by reasonable but incompatible doctrines? This edition includes the essay "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," which outlines Rawls' plans to revise Political Liberalism, which were cut short by his death. "An extraordinary well-reasoned commentary on A Theory of Justice...a decisive turn towards political philosophy." —Times Literary Supplement