A Legal Structure For Effective Income Tax Administration

This report is the ninth edition of the OECD's Tax Administration Series. It provides internationally comparative data on aspects of tax systems and their administration in 59 advanced and emerging economies.

Edited by Victor Thuronyi, this book offers an introduction to a broad range of issues in comparative tax law and is based on comparative discussion of the tax laws of developed countries. It presents practical models and guidelines for drafting tax legislation that can be used by officials of developing and transition countries. Volume I covers general issues, some special topics, and major taxes other than income tax.

Building on previous FAD work in the tax administration field, this paper defines broad criteria for diagnosing the problems in a country’s tax administration and formulating an appropriate reform strategy. To be effective, this strategy should be based on the size of the tax gap and the country’s particular circumstances. This paper discusses some guiding principles which have provided the basis for successful reforms, including: reducing the tax system’s complexity, encouraging taxpayers’ voluntary compliance, differentiating the treatment of taxpayers by their revenue potential, and ensuring the reform’s effective management. Also discussed are specific bottlenecks that hinder the effectiveness of the tax administration’s operations.

This paper examines the role of tax administration in developing countries from an economic perspective. The traditional separation of tax policy and tax administration in the literature is shown to break down in developing countries, where tax administrators decide in what manner complicated tax legislation should actually be applied. After surveying economic literature dealing with tax administration, the paper offers guidelines on how tax administrators can help implement more efficient and equitable tax systems.

Modern tax administrations seek to optimize tax collections while minimizing administration costs and taxpayer compliance costs. Experience shows that voluntary compliance is best achieved through a system of self-assessment. Many tax administrations have introduced self-assessment principles in the income tax law but the legal authority is not being consistently applied. They continue to rely heavily on “desk” auditing a majority of tax returns, while risk management practices remain largely underdeveloped and/or underutilized. There is also plenty of opportunity in many countries to enhance the design and delivery of client-focused taxpayer service programs, and better engage with the private sector and other stakeholders.

Tax administration improvements have contributed significantly to a doubling of China’s tax-to-GDP ratio and the substantial reduction in taxpayers’ compliance costs since the mid-1990s. This paper describes the key features of China’s tax administration and their evolution over the last 20 years. It also identifes emerging challenges to the tax system and areas where further tax administration improvements are needed to sustain tax revenue and reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs in the future.

An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.