Abdication Of Responsibility

What induces groups to commit political suicide? This book explores the decisions to surrender power and to legitimate this surrender: collective abdications. Commonsensical explanations impute such actions to coercive pressures, actors’ miscalculations, or their contamination by ideologies at odds with group interests. Ivan Ermakoff argues that these explanations are either incomplete or misleading. Focusing on two paradigmatic cases of voluntary and unconditional surrender of power—the passing of an enabling bill granting Hitler the right to amend the Weimar constitution without parliamentary supervision (March 1933), and the transfer of full executive, legislative, and constitutional powers to Marshal Pétain (Vichy, France, July 1940)—Ruling Oneself Out recasts abdication as the outcome of a process of collective alignment. Ermakoff distinguishes several mechanisms of alignment in troubled and uncertain times and assesses their significance through a fine-grained examination of actors’ beliefs, shifts in perceptions, and subjective states. To this end, he draws on the analytical and methodological resources of perspectives that usually stand apart: primary historical research, formal decision theory, the phenomenology of group processes, quantitative analyses, and the hermeneutics of testimonies. In elaborating this dialogue across disciplinary boundaries, Ruling Oneself Out restores the complexity and indeterminate character of pivotal collective decisions and demonstrates that an in-depth historical exploration can lay bare processes of crucial importance for understanding the formation of political preferences, the paradox of self-deception, and the makeup of historical events as highly consequential.

Language and logic are inextricably commingled in our everyday speech. What we say, particularly in the form of statements, tends not only to mirror our world, but mold it into our own image. This book looks at how much of our verbal communication can be considered “valid” from the point of view of the rules of logic. Are we saying what we mean to say? Is what we hear from the media, our peers, our leaders, and those who determine the narrative “story” of our lives meaningful, rational, and logical? Even more important than the answers to these questions is the answer to whether we are the governors and rulers of our own lives. Have we abdicated this sovereign rule to forces that may not have our best interests and wellbeing in mind? Using works of Continental and analytic philosophy ancient and modern, psychology, linguistics, religion, and literature, this book supports the thesis that we have surrendered the only thing we could ever possibly own – ourselves – for unprecedented access to consumer goods, credit, and the hope for medical immortality. Further, the argument is made that the prevailing discourse of global modern culture consists of statements which are invalid because their inner semantic structure is inherently contradictory. The argument is aimed at those who want to learn more about what makes our everyday discourse and thinking rational or irrational. At the same time, it indicts the individual of the modern industrialized state for the crime of the voluntary abdication of his sovereignty and for forcing others who have little control over their lives to do the same. This book is a call for introspection in the hope that the reader will see something of the situation described reflected not only in himself, but in the society he inhabits.

How do African states respond to the mass arrival and prolonged presence of refugees? This book answers this question by drawing on recent case studies and examining the politics behind refugee policy in Africa. The implications of this approach are important not only for the study of asylum in Africa, but also for the future of refugee protection.

The latest addition to the very successful one-minute manager series cuts to the very essence of management. A monkey is a problem to be solved, and the message of the book is "don't take on other peoples' problems"--Put the monkey back on the shoulders where it belongs.

To what extent are we responsible for our actions? Philosophical theorizing about this question has recently taken a social turn, marking a shift in focus from traditional metaphysical concerns about free will and determinism. Recent theories have attended to the interpersonal dynamics at the heart of moral responsibility practices and the role of the moral environment in scaffolding agency. Yet, the implications of social inequality and the role of social power for our moral responsibility practices remains a surprisingly neglected topic. The conception of agency involved in current approaches to moral responsibility is overly idealized, assuming that our practices involve interactions between equally empowered and situated agents. In twelve new essays and a substantial introduction, this volume systematically challenges this assumption, exploring the impact of social factors such as power relationships and hierarchies, paternalism, socially constructed identities, race, gender and class on moral responsibility. Social factors have bearing on the circumstances in which agents act as well as on the person or people in the position to hold that agent accountable for his or her action. Additionally, social factors bear on the parties who pass judgment on the agent. Leading theorists of moral responsibility, including Michael McKenna, Marina Oshana, and Manuel Vargas, consider the implications of oppression and structural inequality for their respective theories. Neil Levy urges the need to refocus our analyses of the epistemic and control conditions for moral responsibility from individual to socially extended agents. Leading theorists of relational autonomy, including Catriona Mackenzie, Natalie Stoljar and Andrea Westlund develop new insights into the topic of moral responsibility. Other contributors bring debates about moral responsibility into dialogue with recent work in feminist philosophy, social epistemology and social psychology on topics such as epistemic injustice and implicit bias. Collectively, the essays in this volume reorient philosophical debates about moral responsibility in important new directions.