Accountability Lapses In Multiple Funds For Iraq

Many overseas federal contractors are covered by the Defense Base Act (DBA), which mandates that they provide workers compensation insurance for their employees. As the U.S. military has increased operations in Iraq, the size of the DBA program has grown, and in 2007 over $170 million in cash and medical benefits were paid to nearly 12,000 DBA claimants who were injured or killed while working under contract to the federal government. Congress has become increasingly concerned with the costs involved in the DBA program because the federal government usually reimburses its contractors for their DBA premiums. The Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have seen some cost savings since adopting a single-source model for their DBA insurance in which contractors for each agency are required to purchase insurance from a single company selected by the agency. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is currently testing such a model for its DBA system. For the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD), however, including the Army's large Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, individual contractors are free to select their own DBA insurers and negotiate their own rates.

Consistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba'athist origins of Iraq's budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority's rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition's capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of 'outsiders' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.