Achievements And Challenges Of Fiscal Decentralization

The three forces of democratization, decentralization, and development have swept the world over the last decade and redrawn the maps of politics, power, and prosperity. Modern Mexico has been fully engaged in the trio, making it a rich case study. In recent years, enhanced political competition has redistributed decisionmaking across all levels of government, making the government more accountable to the average citizen. It has also given subnational governments a renewed role as economic agents. The taxation, spending, borrowing, and institutions of Mexican states and municipalities are now increasingly under the rigor of market discipline. The combined, closer scrutiny of voters and financiers is creating a new incentive framework for policymakers-a framework where necessary reforms become both inescapable and, more importantly, a perceived source of potential reward. This book is the product of the analytical work of a large number of experts, Mexican and foreign. In the book, the experts document Mexico's decentralization experience; conceptualize its main trends, policies, and options; and bring it into the light of international comparison. They distill critical lessons and challenges that are of relevance for Mexico, for Latin America and, generally, for countries that are embarking on far reaching decentralization efforts. This renders the volume a major contribution to our knowledge and thinking in this area; and a timely one, since decentralization is an irreversible process that is likely to continue occupying policymakers for years to come.

Ukraine in the 1990s needed to reform its intergovernmental finance system both to increase the overall efficiency of the public sector and to strengthen its nascent democracy. A more transparent system of intergovernmental fiscal relations also held the promise of better addressing the different views about the country's future in eastern and western parts of the country. Reluctantly, at the beginning of the transition but at full force in the late 1990s, Ukraine joined many other countries around the world in an effort to redefine its system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. This book discusses the fiscal decentralisation reform in Ukraine by covering both the deep problems and failures that were encountered for almost a decade and the quite spectacular success of the reforms introduced in 2001.

Fiscal Federalism 2022 surveys recent trends and policies in intergovernmental fiscal relations and subnational government. Accessible and easy-to-read chapters provide insight into: good practices in fiscal federalism; the design of fiscal equalisation systems; measuring subnational tax and spending autonomy; promoting public sector performance across levels of government; digitalisation challenges and opportunities; the role of subnational accounting and insolvency frameworks; funding and financing of local government public investment; and early lessons from the COVID-19 crisis for intergovernmental fiscal relations.

The 1991 government change in Ethiopia ushered in a centralised system of governance, aimed to bring about harmony and cooperation between different groups and to promote local self-rule. It has proceeded in two phases: 1991-2001 centred on creating and powering National/Regional Governments, termed mid-level decentralisation. Further powers were devolved in 2001 through the District Level Decentralization Program and Urban Management Profram. This volume brings together studies by the Forum for Social Studies and others, with the aim of identifying knowledge gaps for further research and to generate debate on the issues in Ethiopia. The study is in two parts: a literature review seeking to document existing studies and highlight research gaps; and field work which involved a rapid assessment of eight weredas and two kifle ketemas in Addis Ababa. The other three studies are synopses of master theses submitted to the Institute of Regional and Local Development Studies of Addis Ababa University.

"While there is extensive knowledge about how to design fiscal decentralization policies, considerably less is understood about how a decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented. Countries embarking on decentralization often struggle with decisions about the essential components of decentralization, including the order of an introduction of decentralization policies, the number of years necessary to bring a full program on line, and the components of the transition strategy. The authors argue that the sequencing of decentralization policies is an important determinant of its success. The consequences of a poorly sequenced decentralization program can range from minor delays and complications to ineffectiveness and subsequent failing support of decentralization efforts, macroeconomic instability, and fundamental failure in public sector delivery. At a minimum, the strategy of "making it up as we go" will not lead to the same structure of decentralization as will a planned strategy. The paper raises two questions: First, is there an optimal sequencing for decentralization policies and implementation? The answer is that there is, and that following these sequencing rules can reduce the costs and risks of implementing fiscal decentralization. Second, to what extent do countries follow these optimal sequencing rules? The answer is, in general, they do not. The gap between theory and practice is a result of the complexity of sequencing design, which discourages fiscal planners from implementing the full process. In addition, sequencing requires a sustained discipline and vision for its implementation, as well as overcoming pressures from political actors, especially in developing countries. "-- World Bank web site.

The fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe raised the complex question of how social services were to be distributed and administered in countries with legacies of highly centralized state. In Poland, a series of reforms attempted to modify and decentralize social service programs. Yet with Poland’s second round of decentralization, long-held and clearly specified reform goals were undermined from the very outset. In this insightful, detailed, and carefully argued study, Janelle A. Kerlin demonstrates how and why reforms, intended to improve services and increase citizen participation in social service programming, largely failed to meet expected goals. The politics of reform development—including political deals, exclusionary tactics, and hidden maneuvering by Polish policymakers—prevented any significant upgrade of services or real change in decision-making structures. Conflicting ideologies and pressures on policy actors stemming from historical, institutional, political, and international sources often resulted in compromises that led to unfavorable public service outcomes. In this book, Kerlin uses focused interviews with leading reform actors and a nationwide representative survey of two hundred public social service institutions to develop a model that connects the politics of the decentralization process with social service outcomes. Not only students of the former Soviet bloc, but also those interested in the links between politics and policy outcomes more broadly will find in this volume an informative and instructive case study that has far-reaching implications.

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