Addressing Cyber Instability

As this report discusses, cyberspace is an inherently unstable national security domain. Its fundamental characteristics, such as the low cost of entry, abundant access points, and the difficulty of attribution, alter traditional power calculations. This enables non-state actors to wage proxy warfare on cyber battlefields, beyond national accountability or control. The vulnerability of national critical infrastructure endangers whole civilian populations, and places private enterprises on the front lines. Additionally, the absence of international norms and comparatively low costs of cyber attacks create incentives for nations to launch preemptive strikes in a coercive attempt to forestall more traditional kinetic conflict. In such an unstable environment, the consequences of misinterpreted signals between nations may be catastrophic. The principal editors of the volume discussed this cyber instability and its implications for the future of cyberspace, and made key recommendations for future US and international cyber policy. The panel participants examined the implications of an unstable environment in cyberspace for purposes of long-term strategy, military operations, domestic and international law, risk management, and other aspects of national security.

As this report discusses, cyberspace is an inherently unstable national security domain. Its fundamental characteristics, such as the low cost of entry, abundant access points, and the difficulty of attribution, alter traditional power calculations. This enables non-state actors to wage proxy warfare on cyber battlefields, beyond national accountability or control. The vulnerability of national critical infrastructure endangers whole civilian populations, and places private enterprises on the front lines. Additionally, the absence of international norms and comparatively low costs of cyber attacks create incentives for nations to launch preemptive strikes in a coercive attempt to forestall more traditional kinetic conflict. In such an unstable environment, the consequences of misinterpreted signals between nations may be catastrophic. The principal editors of the volume discussed this cyber instability and its implications for the future of cyberspace, and made key recommendations for future US and international cyber policy. The panel participants examined the implications of an unstable environment in cyberspace for purposes of long-term strategy, military operations, domestic and international law, risk management, and other aspects of national security.

A wide range of actors have publicly identified cyber stability as a key policy goal but the meaning of stability in the context of cyber policy remains vague and contested. Vague because most policymakers and experts do not define cyber stability when they use the concept. Contested because they propose measures that rely - often implicitly - on divergent understandings of cyber stability. This volume is a thorough investigation of instability within cyberspace and of cyberspace itself. Its purpose is to reconceptualise stability and instability for cyberspace, highlight their various dimensions and thereby identify relevant policy measures. This book critically examines both 'classic' notions associated with stability - for example, whether cyber operations can lead to unwanted escalation - as well as topics that have so far not been addressed in the existing cyber literature, such as the application of a decolonial lens to investigate Euro-American conceptualisations of stability in cyberspace.

Growing dependence on cyberspace for commerce, communication, governance, and military operations has left society vulnerable to a multitude of security threats. Mitigating the inherent risks associated with the use of cyberspace poses a series of thorny public policy problems. In this volume, academics, practitioners from both private sector and government, along with former service members come together to highlight sixteen of the most pressing contemporary challenges in cybersecurity, and to offer recommendations for the future. As internet connectivity continues to spread, this book will offer readers greater awareness of the threats of tomorrow—and serve to inform public debate into the next information age. Contributions by Adrienne Allen, Aaron Brantly, Lauren Boas Hayes, Jane Chong, Joshua Corman, Honorable Richard J. Danzig, Kat Dransfield, Ryan Ellis, Mailyn Fidler, Allan Friedman, Taylor Grossman, Richard M. Harrison, Trey Herr, Drew Herrick, Jonah F. Hill, Robert M. Lee, Herbert S. Lin, Anastasia Mark, Robert Morgus, Paul Ohm, Eric Ormes, Jason Rivera, Sasha Romanosky, Paul Rosenzweig, Matthew Russell, Nathaniel Tisa, Abraham Wagner, Rand Waltzman, David Weinstein, Heather West, and Beau Woods.

Cyberwarfare—like the seismic shift of policy with nuclear warfare—is modifying warfare into non-war warfare. A few distinctive characteristics of cyberwar emerge and blur the distinction between adversary and ally. Cyber probes continuously occur between allies and enemies alike, causing cyberespionage to merge with warfare. Espionage—as old as war itself—has technologically merged with acts of cyberwar as states threaten each other with prepositioned malware in each other’s cyberespionage-probed infrastructure. These two cyber shifts to warfare are agreed upon and followed by the United States, Russia, and China. What is not agreed upon in this shifting era of warfare are the policies on which cyberwarfare is based. In Shadow Warfare, Elizabeth Van Wie Davis charts these policies in three key actors and navigates the futures of policy on an international stage. Essential reading for students of war studies and security professionals alike.

In a world of increasing dependence on information technology, the prevention of cyberattacks on a nation's important computer and communications systems and networks is a problem that looms large. Given the demonstrated limitations of passive cybersecurity defense measures, it is natural to consider the possibility that deterrence might play a useful role in preventing cyberattacks against the United States and its vital interests. At the request of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Research Council undertook a two-phase project aimed to foster a broad, multidisciplinary examination of strategies for deterring cyberattacks on the United States and of the possible utility of these strategies for the U.S. government. The first phase produced a letter report providing basic information needed to understand the nature of the problem and to articulate important questions that can drive research regarding ways of more effectively preventing, discouraging, and inhibiting hostile activity against important U.S. information systems and networks. The second phase of the project entailed selecting appropriate experts to write papers on questions raised in the letter report. A number of experts, identified by the committee, were commissioned to write these papers under contract with the National Academy of Sciences. Commissioned papers were discussed at a public workshop held June 10-11, 2010, in Washington, D.C., and authors revised their papers after the workshop. Although the authors were selected and the papers reviewed and discussed by the committee, the individually authored papers do not reflect consensus views of the committee, and the reader should view these papers as offering points of departure that can stimulate further work on the topics discussed. The papers presented in this volume are published essentially as received from the authors, with some proofreading corrections made as limited time allowed.

This revised and expanded edition of the Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace brings together leading scholars and practitioners to examine how international legal rules, concepts and principles apply to cyberspace and the activities occurring within it. In doing so, contributors highlight the difficulties in applying international law to cyberspace, assess the regulatory efficacy of these rules and, where necessary, suggest adjustments and revisions.

While the deterrence of cyber attacks is one of the most important issues facing the United States and other nations, the application of deterrence theory to the cyber realm is problematic. This study introduces cyber warfare and reviews the challenges associated with deterring cyber attacks, offering key recommendations to aid the deterrence of major cyber attacks.