Administration S Defense Budget

Chapters include: why defense budgets are unstable; post-cold war Transition I: the base force, and Transition II: the Clinton program; the shrinking discretionary spending margin; and risk, reversibility, and defense planning. 50 tables and charts. Index.

Since the war on terrorism began in earnest after September 11, 2001, defense budgets have risen sharply. It would be reassuring to believe that the resources to fight this war will continue to be made available, regardless of its cost or duration, and that Congress and the President will at the same time maintain the broader military capabilities needed to protect the nation's security interests. Fiscal realities, however, have often compromised military capabilities in the past and may do so again in the future. The short-term threat to defense is tied to deficit control. Reducing the very large deficits projected for the next several years will require cutbacks in discretionary spending. As a result, defense will be competing with domestic programs for a shrinking share of the budget, and the politics of this competition could prove highly unfavorable for defense.

Budgeting for national defense is a complex endeavor, particularly for a nation like the U.S. that assumes global responsibility and strives to have the most advanced and lethal force on earth. It is necessary – and challenging – to balance the myriad requirements between current and future readiness, across warfare areas and military services, between having state of the art capability with sufficient capacity, and among people, hardware, and the activities people do with that hardware. As analytically difficult as that problem is, it is embedded in the political budgeting processes and national security must be balanced with every other function of government and there must also be cooperation across branches of government. This text explores that complex endeavor. It takes the position that budgeting for defense is a particular instance of public budgeting which is a particular instance of public policy. Thus, this text starts with a conceptual, empirical, and process foundation before discussing the participants and processes that build the annual defense budget. It then covers the execution of that budget and the ultimate accounting. Compared to the first edition, this text is updated with current figures and examples. There is a new chapter on determinants of military spending in society and burden sharing within alliances. The chapter on budget execution has been disaggregated and a new chapter is devoted to fiscal law. The final chapter seeks to integrate all that came before it by discussing matters that integrate the stages of budgeting and which cross branches of government. Following in the tradition of the first edition, this is intended to be both a textbook for a course in budgeting, but also a desktop reference for defense budgeting practitioners.

U.S. defense spending isn’t excessive and, in fact, should continue to grow because it’s both affordable and necessary in today's challenging world. The United States spends a lot of money on defense—$607 billion in the current fiscal year. But Brookings national security scholar Michael O'Hanlon argues that is roughly the right amount given the overall size of the national economy and continuing U.S. responsibilities around the world. If anything, he says spending should increase modestly under the next president, remaining near 3 percent of gross domestic product. Recommendations in this book differ from the president's budget plan in two key ways. First, the author sees a mismatch in the Pentagon’s current plans between ends and means. The country needs to spend enough money to carry out its military missions and commitments. Second, O'Hanlon recommends dropping a plan to cut the size of the Army from the current 475,000 active-duty soldiers to 450,000. The U.S. national defense budget is entirely affordable—relative to the size of the economy, relative to past levels of effort by this country in the national security domain, and relative, especially, to the costs of failing to uphold a stable international order. Even at a modestly higher price, it will be the best $650 billion bargain going, and a worthy investment in this country’s security and its long-term national power.

Analysis of the FY 2021 Defense Budget from the CSIS Defense Budget Analysis program provides an in-depth assessment of the Trump administration's request for national defense funding in FY 2021. The analysis addresses overall trends in the defense budget, changes in the FY 2021 request, and issues for Congress and the next administration to consider. It also covers the budgets of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Space Force.