Advanced Microeconomic Theory

This advanced economics text bridges the gap between familiarity with microeconomic theory and a solid grasp of the principles and methods of modern neoclassical microeconomic theory.

An introduction to advanced topics in microeconomics that emphasizes the intuition behind assumptions and results, providing examples that show how to apply theory to practice. This textbook offers an introduction to advanced microeconomic theory that emphasizes the intuition behind mathematical assumptions, providing step-by-step examples that show how to apply theoretical models. It covers standard topics such as preference relations, demand theory and applications, producer theory, choice under uncertainty, partial and general equilibrium, monopoly, game theory and imperfect competition, externalities and public goods, and contract theory; but its intuitive and application-oriented approach provides students with a bridge to more technical topics. The book can be used by advanced undergraduates as well as Masters students in economics, finance, and public policy, and by PhD students in programs with an applied focus. The text connects each topic with recent findings in behavioral and experimental economics, and discusses these results in context, within the appropriate chapter. Step-by-step examples appear immediately after the main theoretical findings, and end-of chapter exercises help students understand how to approach similar exercises on their own. An appendix reviews basic mathematical concepts. A separate workbook, Practice Exercises for Advanced Microeconomic Theory, offers solutions to selected problems with detailed explanations. The textbook and workbook together help students improve both their theoretical and practical preparation in advanced microeconomics.

Devoted to modern consumer and producer theories. Examines the behavior of economic agents when they come together on market. Provides strategic behavior.

This textbook for master programs in economics offers a comprehensive overview of microeconomics. It employs a carefully graded approach where basic game theory concepts are already explained within the simpler decision framework. The unavoidable mathematical content is supplied when needed, not in an appendix. The book covers a lot of ground, from decision theory to game theory, from bargaining to auction theory, from household theory to oligopoly theory, and from the theory of general equilibrium to regulation theory. Additionally, cooperative game theory is introduced. This textbook has been recommended and developed for university courses in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

Solutions and detailed explanations for odd-numbered end-of-chapter exercises (107 problems) in Felix Muñoz-Garcia's Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Felix Muñoz-Garcia's Advanced Microeconomic Theory provides examples and exercises that help students understand how to apply theoretical models and offers tools for approaching similar problems on their own. This workbook provides solutions and step-by-step explanations for the odd-numbered exercises (107 problems in total). The answer key and detailed explanations emphasize the economic intuition behind the mathematical assumptions and results and, in combination with the textbook, enable students to improve both their theoretical and practical preparation.

A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.

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