Affirmative Action And Equal Protection

When federal courts have analyzed and addressed "affirmative action" in higher education, they have done so in two distinct but related senses, both under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection." The first has its roots in the original sense of "affirmative action: " the mandatory use of race by public education systems to eliminate the remnants of state-imposed racial segregation. Because state-sanctioned race segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in certain cases involving a state's formerly de jure segregated public university system, a state's consideration of race in its higher education policies and practices may be an affirmative obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its consequential 1992 decision United States v. Fordice, equal protection may require states that formerly maintained de jure segregated university systems to consider race for the purpose of eliminating all vestiges of their prior "dual" systems. Drawing upon its precedent addressing racially segregated public schools in the K-12 context, the Court established a three-part legal standard in Fordice for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of a state's efforts in "dismantl[ing]" its formerly de jure segregated public university system. To that remedial end, mandatory race-conscious measures-in this de jure context-are not limited to admissions. Instead, remedies may also address policies and practices relating to academic programs, institutional missions, funding, and other aspects of public university operations. Outside this de jure context, "affirmative action" has come to refer to a different category of race-conscious policies. These involve what the Court at one time called the "benign" use of racial classifications-voluntary measures designed not to remedy past de jure discrimination, but to help racial minorities overcome the effects of their earlier exclusion. And for institutions of higher education, the Court has addressed one type of affirmative action policy in particular: the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, a practice now widely observed by both public and private colleges and universities. The federal courts have come to subject these voluntary race-conscious policies-"affirmative action" in its perhaps more familiar sense-to a particularly searching form of review known as strict scrutiny. And even though this heightened judicial scrutiny has long been regarded as strict in theory but fatal in fact, the Court's review of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education has proved a notable exception, with the Court having twice upheld universities' use of race as one of many factors considered when assembling their incoming classes. The Court has long grappled with this seeming tension-between the strictness of its scrutiny and its approval of race-conscious admissions policies-beginning with its landmark 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke through its 2016 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas. Though the Equal Protection Clause generally concerns public universities and their constitutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutory law also plays a role in ensuring equal protection in higher education. To that end, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funding-including private colleges and universities-from, at a minimum, discriminating against students and applicants in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education, investigate and administratively enforce institutions' compliance with Title VI.

Since the 1960s, the United States government has issued executive orders and passed legislation aimed at achieving fair workplace hiring practices. Critics maintain that, in an attempt to ameliorate past injustices, the government has gone too far by practicing affirmative action--what opponents call "reverse discrimination." Students can use this book as a guide to the history of affirmative action, crucial moments in the timeline of this cause, and a better understanding of what affirmative actions practices may mean for the future.

C. Goals and timetables

Traces the history of this divisive national issue, as reflected in the writings of key opinion makers and in public documents

Few issues seem able to polarise the nation as easily as affirmative action. The question of how, even whether, to rectify past discrimination in jobs, schools, and law against women and minorities is a perpetually vexing one. While some call for a quota system to set minimum percentages and numbers for minority positions, others say qualifications should take precedence over race when hiring an employee, admitting a student, or enforcing a law. Civil rights groups claim that specific quotas are often the only way to make up for systemic racism; those opposing such actions cite 'reverse racism' affecting whites. Recent federal, state, and local cases have challenged several affirmative action programs, particularly those involving school admissions. Decisions in Texas and Michigan, for example have struck down the use of racial standards in choosing which applicants to admit to universities. Bills have been introduced to eliminate affirmative action programs in many state legislatures, though there are some who want to 'mend, not end' affirmative action. Because this most crucial issue of race relations shows no signs of disappearing, the analysis in this book takes on added importance. Taking a look at affirmative action from a legal standpoint, the book addresses and assesses the history, current status, and future of affirmative action initiatives and programs. Such a study is much-needed in gathering information about a raging national debate.

These essays, with one exception originally published in Philosophy & Public Affairs, consider the moral problems associated with improving the social and economic position of disadvantaged groups. If the situation of women and minorities improves so that their opportunities are equal to those of more favored groups, will they then be in a competitive position conducive to equal achievement? If not, can preferential hiring or preferential admission to educational institutions be justified? The contributors explore the complexities of this problem from several points of view. The discussions in Part I are more theoretical and concentrate on the application to this case of general considerations from ethical theory. The discussions in Part II also take up theoretical questions, but they start from specific problems about the constitutionality and the effectiveness of certain methods of achieving equality and counteracting discrimination. The two groups of essays demonstrate admirably the close connection between moral philosophy and questions of law and policy. The issues discussed include compensation, liability, victimization, the significance of group membership, the intrinsic importance of racial, sexual, or meritocratic criteria, and the overall effects of preferential policies.