Afghan National Security Forces Afghan Corruption And The Development Of An Effective Fighting Force

Afghan National Security Forces : Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force : hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, second session, hearing held August 2, 2012.

We will call to order the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for a hearing on Afghan National Security Forces, specifically looking at Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force. This afternoon we have before us a panel of experts to provide testimony about how corruption in Afghanistan might impede the development of that nation's security forces. Corruption could prevent army and police units from successfully assuming the responsibility for securing Afghanistan from internal and external threats after 2014. Corruption also potentially reduces the operational effectiveness of security forces and jeopardizes their legitimacy with their population. In order for the United States to achieve its strategic goal of denying terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan, it is essential that Afghan forces be capable of maintaining security and stability after transition is complete in 2014.

Mr. WITTMAN. Ladies and gentleman, thank you all so much. We will call to order the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for a hearing on Afghan National Security Forces, specifically looking at Afghan corruption and the development of an effective fighting force. I want to welcome folks today as our subcommittee convenes the fifth and final hearing in our series related to the Afghan National Security Forces. This afternoon we have before us a panel of experts to provide testimony about how corruption in Afghanistan might impede the development of that nation's security forces. Corruption could prevent army and police units from successfully assuming the responsibility for securing Afghanistan from internal and external threats after 2014. Corruption also potentially reduces the operational effectiveness of security forces and jeopardizes their legitimacy with their population. In order for the United States to achieve its strategic goal of denying terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan, it is essential that Afghan forces be capable of maintaining security and stability after transition is complete in 2014. Our purpose today is not to undertake a comprehensive assessment of corruption in the region, but instead to narrowly focus on how corruption affects the development of an effective Afghan army and police. Our panel today includes retired Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a Foreign Policy Study Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service. Thank you for your participation today. We appreciate you taking your time and we look forward to your testimony.

Details the establishment of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Examines future prospects of this force by analyzing its strengths and weaknesses, and views these within a broader context of the civil, military, and economic conflict that affects both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Includes bibliographical references (p. ).

This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war