Airpower And The 1972 Spring Invasion

Illustrated with over 30 maps, diagrams and photos In our continuing desire to bring to the reader an in-depth look at the use of airpower in Southeast Asia, we present. In this volume a truly monumental effort at recounting the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events and operations that took place during the spring invasion of 1972. In this monograph, the authors from the Air War College present an illuminating story of the people and machines that fought so gallantly during this major enemy offensive. The authors’ breadth of experience in and out of combat enables them to provide a penetrating account of how airpower was brought to bear upon the enemy. The “Vietnamization” program, begun in 1969, had by March of 1972 reduced U. S. manpower involvement in Vietnam from 500,000 to 95,000. U. S. airpower involvement, however, did not decrease proportionately. Although the South Vietnamese Air Force took up the “lion’s share” of the effort, U. S. airmen were still very much involved. During the offensive, their skills, courage and professionalism were tested 24 hours a day, directly contributing to the eventual successful outcome. The reader should learn from this story that not only is airpower an essential element of any major operation, but that its employment is a team effort. More so, it involves men and women on the ground as well as in the air-one cannot function without the other.

In our continuing desire to bring to the reader an in-depth look at the use of airpower in Southeast Asia, we present in this volume a truly monumental effort at recounting the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events and operations that took place during the spring invasion of 1972. In this monograph, the authors from the Air War College present an illuminating story of the people and machines that fought so gallantly during this major enemy offensive. The authors' breadth of experience in and out of combat enables them to provide a penetrating account of how airpower was brought to bear upon the enemy. The "Vietnamization" program, begun in 1969, had by March of 1972 reduced U. S. manpower involvement in Vietnam from 500,000 to 95,000. U. S. airpower involvement, however, did not decrease proportionately. Although the South Vietnamese Air Force took up the "lion's share" of the effort, U. S. airmen were still very much involved. During the offensive, their skills, courage and professionalism were tested 24 hours a day, directly contributing to the eventual successful outcome. The reader should learn from this story that not only is airpower an essential element of any major operation, but that its employment is a team effort. More so, it involves men and women on the ground as well as in the air -- one cannot function without the other.

Since 1969, Pres. Nixon had gradually disengaged American ground forces in Vietnam, and an accelerated plan for "Vietnamizing" U.S. war roles had taken form. The U.S. remained determined to avoid further new commitments of U.S. ground forces. In 1972 N. Vietnamese Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap bid for victory, gambling the full strength of the N. Vietnamese Army and its weaponry. Allied officers agreed that an early offensive was possible, likely in the middle of Feb., and Nixon's scheduled visit to the China. This monograph recounts the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events and operations that took place during the spring invasion of 1972. Illustrated.

The Air Force presents this volume, a truly monumental effort at recounting the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events and operations that took place during the spring invasion of Vietnam in 1972. The authors present an illuminating story of people and machines that fought so gallantly during this major enemy offensive.

In the spring of 1972, North Vietnam launched a massive, three-pronged attack into South Vietnam that was eventually repulsed by South Vietnamese forces, United States (US) advisors and massive amounts of American airpower. The problem is determining what factors were key to South Vietnam’s successful defense. To that point, this thesis will address the overall effectiveness of US airpower in defeating North Vietnam’s attack. This paper first examines the strategic and operational environment surrounding the 1972 offensive, including the role and influence that the leaders of the US, Saigon, Hanoi, China, and the Soviet Union had on the conflict. It then shifts to the three primary tactical battles, describing each in detail, from the initial communist successes to their ultimate defeat. Finally, the analysis focuses specifically on airpower’s role, from the massive strategic deployment that doubled the available assets in theater in just over a month, to its operational success striking targets in North Vietnam, to its tactical successes on the various battlefields of South Vietnam. Ultimately, this analysis determines that US airpower, with US advisors playing a critical enabling role, was the decisive element in the defeat of North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive.