Algorithmics Of Matching Under Preferences

Matching problems with preferences are all around us OCo they arise when agents seek to be allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes. Efficient algorithms are needed for producing matchings that optimise the satisfaction of the agents according to their preference lists.In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences, partly reflecting the growing number of applications of these problems worldwide. This book describes the most important results in this area, providing a timely update to The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (D Gusfield and R W Irving, MIT Press, 1989) in connection with stable matching problems, whilst also broadening the scope to include matching problems with preferences under a range of alternative optimality criteria."

Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes. Efficient algorithms are needed for producing matchings that optimise the satisfaction of the agents according to their preference lists. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences, partly reflecting the growing number of applications of these problems worldwide. The importance of the research area was recognised in 2012 through the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley. This book describes the most important results in this area, providing a timely update to The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (D Gusfield and R W Irving, MIT Press, 1989) in connection with stable matching problems, whilst also broadening the scope to include matching problems with preferences under a range of alternative optimality criteria. Contents:Preliminary Definitions, Results and MotivationStable Matching Problems:The Stable Marriage Problem: An UpdateSM and HR with IndifferenceThe Stable Roommates ProblemFurther Stable Matching ProblemsOther Optimal Matching Problems:Pareto Optimal MatchingsPopular MatchingsProfile-Based Optimal Matchings Readership: Students and Professionals interested in algorithms, especially in the study of algorithmic aspects of matching problems with preferences. Keywords:Matching Problems;Preferences;Algorithms;Stable Marriage Problem;Hospitals / Residents Problem;House Allocation Problem;Stable Roomates ProblemKey Features:Provides a much-needed “sequel” to Gusfield and Irving, given that so many papers on matching problems with preferences have been published since 1989Collects together a survey of the main results from these publications in a single volumeContains unique single survey on efficient algorithms for constructing optimal matchings where the optimality criterion does not involve stabilityReviews: “Besides being extremely useful to those who are interested in design and analysis techniques related to algorithms and complexity issues related to the matching of agents to one another when preferences are involved, involved readers can also benefit from the easy way it presents various ideas and approaches to problem solutions. It is written in a highly scientific language and it is extraordinarily beneficial reading for post-docs and researchers in mathematics and in game theory that focus on algorithms for solving matching problems and also study applications involving such problems.” Zentralblatt MATH

Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.

This book probes the stable marriage problem and its variants as a rich source of problems and ideas that illustrate both the design and analysis of efficient algorithms. It covers the most recent structural and algorithmic work on stable matching problems, simplifies and unifies many earlier proofs, strengthens several earlier results, and presents new results and more efficient algorithms. The authors develop the structure of the set of stable matchings in the stable marriage problem in a more general and algebraic context than has been done previously; they discuss the problem's structure in terms of rings of sets, which allows many of the most useful features to be seen as features of a more general set of problems. The relationship between the structure of the stable marriage problem and the more general stable roommates problem is demonstrated, revealing many commonalities. The results the authors obtain provide an algorithmic response to the practical, and political, problems created by the asymmetry inherent in the Gale Shapley solutions, leading to alternative methods and better compromises than are provided by the Gale Shapley method. And, in contrast to Donald Knuth's earlier work which primarily focused on the application of mathematics to the analysis of algorithms, this book illustrates the productive and almost inseparable relationship between mathematical insight and the design of efficient algorithms. Dan Gusfield is Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Robert W. Irving is Senior Lecturer in Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. The Stable Marriage Problem is included in the Foundations of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey and Albert Meyer.

Bachelor Thesis from the year 2009 in the subject Economics - Other, grade: 5.0, University of Zurich (Sozialökonomisches Institut (SOI)), language: English, abstract: Matching is the part of economics that deals with the question of who gets what, e.g. who gets which jobs, who goes to which university, who receives which organ or who marries whom. During the second part of the last century, many markets have been discovered to have failed in providing the necessary conditions for efficient matches. These market failures have partly evolved on ethical or institutional grounds, but are more generally attributed to congestion or coordination problems caused by the inability of the market to make it safe for participants to act on their private information. For this reason, a variety of allocation mechanisms have been developed and subsequently tested in field and laboratory experiments for possible implementation in real-world applications. This work attempts at giving a condensed review of different matching mechanisms and the performance of algorithms that have been implemented for solving the problems in their respective environments. The theoretical properties of these mechanisms as described in the increasingly vast literature on matching design will be used as a benchmark to compare their relative performance in terms of overall efficiency. The results yield some basic insights in the varying success of the competing algorithms in practice, indicating that both the quality of theoretical predictions and the actual performance of the algorithms decrease with the complexity of market environments. In particular, they show that imperfections of markets such as information asymmetry and incentive problems can have far-reaching consequences with respect to the effective working of matching procedures.

Issues of matching and searching on elementary discrete structures arise pervasively in computer science and many of its applications, and their relevance is expected to grow as information is amassed and shared at an accelerating pace. Several algorithms were discovered as a result of these needs, which in turn created the subfield of Pattern Matching. This book provides an overview of the current state of Pattern Matching as seen by specialists who have devoted years of study to the field. It covers most of the basic principles and presents material advanced enough to faithfully portray the current frontier of research. Because of these recent advances, this is the right time for a book that brings together information relevant to both graduate students and specialists in need of an in-depth reference.

'This is a very stimulating book!' - N. G. de Bruijn. 'This short book will provide extremely enjoyable reading to anyone with an interest in discrete mathematics and algorithm design' - ""Mathematical Reviews"". 'This book is an excellent (and enjoyable) means of sketching a large area of computer science for specialists in other fields: It requires little previous knowledge, but expects of the reader a degree of mathematical facility and a willingness to participate. It is really neither a survey nor an introduction; rather, it is a paradigm, a fairly complete treatment of a single example used as a synopsis of a larger subject' - ""SIGACT News"". 'Anyone would enjoy reading this book. If one had to learn French first, it would be worth the effort!' - ""Computing Reviews"". The above citations are taken from reviews of the initial French version of this text - a series of seven expository lectures that were given at the University of Montreal in November of 1975.The book uses the appealing theory of stable marriage to introduce and illustrate a variety of important concepts and techniques of computer science and mathematics: data structures, control structures, combinatorics, probability, analysis, algebra, and especially the analysis of algorithms. The presentation is elementary, and the topics are interesting to nonspecialists. The theory is quite beautiful and developing rapidly. Exercises with answers, an annotated bibliography, and research problems are included.The text would be appropriate as supplementary reading for undergraduate research seminars or courses in algorithmic analysis and for graduate courses in combinatorial algorithms, operations research, economics, or analysis of algorithms. Donald E. Knuth is one of the most prominent figures of modern computer science. His works in ""The Art of Computer Programming"" are classic. He is also renowned for his development of TeX and METAFONT. In 1996, Knuth won the prestigious Kyoto Prize, considered to be the nearest equivalent to a Nobel Prize in computer science.

This book probes the stable marriage problem and its variants as a rich source of problems and ideas that illustrate both the design and analysis of efficient algorithms. It covers the most recent structural and algorithmic work on stable matching problems, simplifies and unifies many earlier proofs, strengthens several earlier results, and presents new results and more efficient algorithms.The authors develop the structure of the set of stable matchings in the stable marriage problem in a more general and algebraic context than has been done previously; they discuss the problem's structure in terms of rings of sets, which allows many of the most useful features to be seen as features of a more general set of problems. The relationship between the structure of the stable marriage problem and the more general stable roommates problem is demonstrated, revealing many commonalities.The results the authors obtain provide an algorithmic response to the practical, and political, problems created by the asymmetry inherent in the Gale Shapley solutions, leading to alternative methods and better compromises than are provided by the Gale Shapley method. And, in contrast to Donald Knuth's earlier work which primarily focused on the application of mathematics to the analysis of algorithms, this book illustrates the productive and almost inseparable relationship between mathematical insight and the design of efficient algorithms.Dan Gusfield is Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Robert W. Irving is Senior Lecturer in Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. The Stable Marriage Problem is included in the Foundations of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey and Albert Meyer.