America Britain And The Cyprus Crisis Of 1974

America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

This book examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. It considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the paper attempts to ascertain whether there exists any evidence to support the belief that either Britain or America or both were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as colluding with Ankara in its subsequent partition of the island.

This book examines the ideological and socio-political discourses shaping the remembrance and representation of Britain and the Cyprus conflict of 1974 within Greek Cypriot society. By combining the official with the popular and drawing on an extensive range of oral history interviews, this monograph shows that a suspicion born out of Britain’s long (neo-)colonial connection to Cyprus has come to frame the image and understanding of British actions associated with the events, and lasting consequences, of 1974. Indeed, with the island of Cyprus still divided, and the requirement to remember a national imperative, this book has a direct contemporary relevance. However, within the existent literature, while much has been written about the political roots of the Cyprus conflict, no study has yet sought to systematically analyse and understand the influences shaping the history and memory of British actions on Cyprus in 1974. One defined by the existence of 'partitionist' conspiracies, collusive accusations and a series of memory distortions which continue to resonate strongly irrespective of the evidence that is now available. As such, by analysing the influences shaping the image of Britain in 1974, one can begin to understand in ever greater detail the Anglo–Greek Cypriot relationship in a modern context.

"Cyprus after World War II was - and continues to be - a focal point for diplomatic and military negotiations and disagreements between both local and international powers. In 'Britain and Cyprus', William Mallinson, a former British diplomat, has selected from a wealth of documents drawn from the National Archives, skilfully combining the chronology of events with vital themes and motifs. Several of these documents have been obtained directly from the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, thanks to the help - and pressure - of the Information Commissioner, under the Freedom of Information Act. Its blend of documentation with incisive exploration and analysis makes this book an invaluable resource for all those interested in the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean, British history and in the process of policy formulation."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

Acknowledgements p. XI Introduction p. 1 Literature Review p. 4 1 The Centre of a Pre-Copernican Universe: A Very Short History of Cyprus p. 11 2 The Road to Disaster: Makarios and the Junta p. 15 3 Coup d'etat in Nicosia: The First 48 Hours p. 21 The Evacuation of Makarios p. 36 Contingency Plans and Delaying Tactics p. 39 4 Joint Intervention? p. 49 Kissinger's 'pet idea' - The Clerides Solution p. 56 Downing Street Meeting, 17 July 1974 p. 57 5 'Promoting a solution which will be in US interests', 18 July 1974 p. 65 6 Sisco in Athens and Ankara: Kissinger's Failure to Restrain the Turks, 19 July 1974 p. 75 Makarios at the Security Council p. 87 NATO's Attitude toward the Crisis p. 89 7 'A new ballgame': Turkey's First Military Operation p. 91 8 The First Two 'Ceasefires', 21 and 22 July 1974: The Road to the First Geneva Conference p. 105 The Sinking of the Kocatepe p. 111 Anglo-Turkish Confrontation at Kyrenia, 22 - 23 July 1974 p. 112 9 'A net gain for the West': Political Implications of the Turkish Military Operation p. 117 10 Further Anglo-Turkish Confrontation, 23-26 July 1974 p. 125 Confrontation at Nicosia Airport p. 126 11 Blockade of Northern Cyprus? The First Major Anglo-American Rift p. 133 12 The Danger for Turkish Cypriot Communities p. 139 13 First Geneva Conference, 25-30 July 1974 p. 147 The Eviction of the UN from Kyrenia - Britain Considers Military Intervention p. 162 The Final Phase at Geneva p. 165 14 Between the Talks, 1-12 August 1974 p. 171 15 Second Geneva Conference, 8-13 August 1974 p. 181 The Kissinger Solution - Cantonal Proposal p. 195 'There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus' - Final US Efforts to Save the Conference p. 210 The Final Showdown p. 213 16 Stopping the Turks? Final Debates on British/UNFICYP Military Intervention and a Greek Convoy p. 217 17 War, 14-16 August 1974 p. 225 Confrontation at Ayios Nikolaos, 15 August 1974 - The Last Possible Anglo-Turkish Showdown or the 'Trigger-Happy' Commander p. 230 Diplomatic Activities p. 231 The Final Day, 16 August 1974 p. 238 18 Big and Little Lies: Conspiracy Theories Gain Ground p. 241 Anglo-Turkish Collusion or Anglo-Greek Collusion? - The Evacuation of Officers from the British Bases p. 244 'If these attitudes continue we will wash our hands of the whole thing' - The Death of Roger Davies p. 246 19 Permitting Racial Separation: Attempts at Post-Crisis Management p. 249 A Present for Secretary Kissinger - Greek-Cypriot Territory as a Bargaining Chip p. 254 'A hard character with not much charity in his soul' - A Change in Turkish Attitude p. 256 Tyler's Mission to Athens - No Chance for a Solution p. 260 20 Refugees and War Crimes p. 265 Refugees on the British Bases p. 266 Population Exchange p. 272 Exchange of Prisoners p. 273 Missing Persons - and other War Crimes p. 274 21 Beyond the Crisis: Cyprus from Cold War to Annan p. 281 Conclusion: 'There is no nation of maniacs I don't get involved in': Henry Kissinger's Idiosyncratic Methods of Working p. 289 Annexes p. 299 Notes p. 305 Bibliography p. 353 Index p. 361.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.