An Alternative Economic Governance For The European Union

The main goal of this report is to analyse those elements underpinning the economic governance in the European Union. In light of the current economic crisis, re-thinking the economic EU architecture, and in particularly that of the euro zone, appears more needed than ever. 0Vence argues that the crisis hitting the EU since 2007 is not only economic, but is, to a great extent, political. To him it represents the failure of a certain model of European integration which has proved to be all too fragile. 0Analysing the current financial, economic and political structure of Europe it becomes clear that there is an important choice to be made in terms of crises-exit policies: (1) continuing with the existing exit strategy, which will very probably lead to an economic impasse in the short to medium term, or (2) accepting the need to adopt a new paradigm, implementing deep institutional changes that steer up European economies.

Within the framework of the new European economic governance, neoliberal views on wages have further increased in prominence and have steered various reforms of collective bargaining rules and practices. As the crisis in Europe came to be largely interpreted as a crisis of competitiveness, wages were seen as the core adjustment variable for ‘internal devaluation’, the claim being that competitiveness could be restored through a reduction of labour costs. This book proposes an alternative view according to which wage developments need to be strengthened through a Europe-wide coordinated reconstruction of collective bargaining as a precondition for more sustainable and more inclusive growth in Europe. It contains major research findings from the CAWIE2 – Collectively Agreed Wages in Europe – project, conducted in 2014–2015 for the purpose of discussing and debating the currently dominant policy perspectives on collectively-bargained wage systems under the new European economic governance.

In the course of its development the EU has had to deal with an expanding policy agenda, covering ever more subjects and an increased diversity of instruments. It has also had to deal with an increased number of member states and an extended range of partners (regional authorities, non governmental organisations). These developments have greatly increased the risk of inconsistencies between the various policies pursued and between the various levels of competence for the same policy. Inconsistent policies are less effective than they ought to be. So, they imply a welfare loss. The EU has tried to cope with the challenge of consistency by adapting its governance. Traditionally it uses mainly the regulatory method. The effectiveness of this method has recently come into question. So alternative methods are now favoured. One is the financial method; which implies more expenditure via the EU budget. The other is coordination. The application of both methods has certain advantages and disadvantages. The problem for policy makers is then to determine the choice between the modes first and the optimal level of budgetary and coordination efforts next. Notwithstanding its obvious policy relevance the problem has got little attention from academia. This book sets out to contribute to a solution by following two approaches. The first is a systematisation of the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the financial and coordination methods. The second is an empirical investigation into a range of European policy processes, implying to different degrees budgetary outlays and coordination.

The global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis exposed the inadequacy of European economic governance. Despite the multitude of new mechanisms and institutions that have arisen over the last few years, many contend that economic governance remains inadequate and the EU must integrate even further to calm still-volatile markets. A tension exists between creating effective instruments that will not overstep the authority delegated to an EU that has integrated economically but not politically. Can the EU’s economic governance system satisfy the demands of markets and politics? Relevant issues include the ability of supranational institutions to dictate policy to national governments, the harmonization of economic policies and institutions across Europe, and a substantial increase in the transfer of funds across borders. Can monetary union continue without political union? How will the new institutions alter the distribution of power between EU institutions as well as between member states? This edited volume analyzes the major policy challenges and institutional mechanisms at the EU- and international levels to combat the global financial crisis and the EU’s sovereign debt crisis such as financial integration, fiscal cooperation, and the rising power of the ECB. This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of European Integration.

The creation of Monetary Union marked a major step in the evolution of the European Union. Is the EU now taking the next step of deeper integration towards a fully-fledged economic government? The book seeks to answer this question by studying the evolution, execution and performance of new modes of economic policy co-ordination as potential stepping-stones towards more institutionalized forms of economic governance.

A critical analysis of the legal dimension of European Union economic governance.

During the current economic crisis recurring questions on the validity of the liberal economic system have resurfaced concerning the role of the state and the free market, the proactive use of fiscal policies, economic nationalism, and environmental sustainablity. This volume covers this subject.