An Analysis In Coalition Warfare

This book develops a framework for analysis, and a set of research strategies, to better understand the conditions and mechanisms involved in the considerable use of caveats by states contributing militarily to coalition operations. In the professional language of military servicemen, security analysts and decision-makers, “caveats” refers to the reservations on the use of force states put on their military contingents as a precondition to participate in particular multinational enforcement operations. Such understood caveats are an instrument of statecraft and foreign policy. However, caveats also are a potential threat to the integrity and military effectiveness of the coalition force in question, and, further down the road, an erosion on the fabric of security alliances. This volume is ideal for audiences interested in military and defence studies, security studies and coalition warfare.

Recent history indicates that, in most, if not all, future military conflicts, the United States will participate as part of a coalition. Examination of successful coalitions from the past may reveal precepts which can be applied in order to successfully approach participation in future coalitions. The Battle of Theipzig in 1813 is a superb example of successful coalition operations from early 19th Century. Its detailed study and analysis has led the author to the conclusion that, different principles apply to successful prosecution of coalition operations at each level of war. Understanding and orchestrating the precepts that apply at each level will give the United States the best chance for successful prosecution of its future strategic objectives during war.

Recent history indicates that, in most, if not all, future military conflicts, the United States will participate as part of a coalition. Examination of successful coalitions from the past may reveal precepts which can be applied in order to successfully approach participation in future coalitions. The Battle of Leipzig in 1813 is a superb example of successful coalition operations from early 19th Century. Its detailed study and analysis has led the author to the conclusion that, different principles apply to successful prosecution of coalition operations at each level of war. Understanding and orchestrating the precepts that apply at each level will give the United States the best chance for successful prosecution of its future strategic objectives during war.

What qualities make an ally useful in coalition warfare, and when is an ally more trouble than it’s worth? Allies That Count analyzes the utility of junior partners in coalition warfare and reaches surprising conclusions. In this volume, Olivier Schmitt presents detailed case-study analysis of several US allies in the Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, the Iraq War, and the war in Afghanistan. He also includes a broader comparative analysis of 204 junior partners in various interventions since the end of the Cold War. This analysis bridges a gap in previous studies about coalition warfare, while also contributing to policy debates about a recurring defense dilemma. Previous works about coalition warfare have focused on explaining how coalitions are formed, but little attention has been given to the issue of their effectiveness. Simultaneously, policy debates, have framed the issue of junior partners in multinational military operations in terms of a trade-off between the legitimacy that is allegedly gained from a large number of coalition states vs. the decrease in military effectiveness associated with the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare. Schmitt determines which political and military variables are more likely to create utility, and he challenges the conventional wisdom about the supposed benefit of having as many states as possible in a coalition. Allies That Count will be of interest to students and scholars of security studies and international relations as well as military practitioners and policymakers.

When the Germans requested an armistice in October 1918, it was a shock to the Allied political and military leadership. They had been expecting, and planning for, the war to continue into 1919, the year they hoped to achieve a complete military victory over the Central Powers. Meighen McCrae illuminates how, throughout this planning process, the Supreme War Council evolved to become the predominant mechanism for coalition war-making. She analyses the Council's role in the formulation of an Allied strategy for 1918–1919 across the various theatres of war and compares the perspectives of the British, French, Americans and Italians. In doing so we learn how, in an early example of modern alliance warfare, the Supreme War Council had to coordinate national needs with coalition ones.

This report describes factors that seem to be associated with U.S. decisions to use coalitions for military interventions, factors that drive partner states to join such coalitions, and factors that shape the success of military coalitions.