An Analysis Of The Feasibility And Benefits Of Standardizing The Management Of Flight Safety Critical Parts With The Department Of Defense

Flight Safety Critical Parts (FSCP) are parts that if they fail will cause loss of aircraft and possible loss of life. Each Service within DOD has their own practices and procedures for management, acquisition, and categorizing of FSCP, e.g., Flight Safety Parts, Flight Safety Critical Items, Flight Safety Critical Parts, Critical Safety Items, etc. Due to the diversity between Services, there is significant confusion within DOD and private industry regarding the acquisition, management, and disposal of FSCP. Many of the parts identified as FSCP are used on aircraft operated by more than one Service and on civilian aircraft. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) manages parts that are common between Services, which include many FSCPs. Management for FSCP that cross component lines, with each Service providing unique specification, is very difficult. Identification, procurement, testing, and management of Flight Safety Parts need to be consistent between Services in order to provide one standard and one face to industry. Standardization of policies and procedures will increase the potential for the procurement of safe reliable FSCP and decrease the risk of selling faulty surplus FSCP to private industry.

System safety is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle. System safety is to safety as systems engineering is to engineering. When performing appropriate analysis, the evaluation is performed holistically by tying into systems engineering practices and ensuring that system safety has an integrated system-level perspective.The NASA System Safety Handbook presents the overall framework for System Safety and provides the general concepts needed to implement the framework. The treatment addresses activities throughout the system life cycle to assure that the system meets safety performance requirements and is as safe as reasonably practicable.This handbook is intended for project management and engineering teams and for those with review and oversight responsibilities. It can be used both in a forward-thinking mode to promote the development of safe systems, and in a retrospective mode to determine whether desired safety objectives have been achieved.The topics covered in this volume include general approaches for formulating a hierarchy of safety objectives, generating a corresponding hierarchical set of safety claims, characterizing the system safety activities needed to provide supporting evidence, and presenting a risk-informed safety case that validates the claims. Volume 2, to be completed in 2012, will provide specific guidance on the conduct of the major system safety activities and the development of the evidence.

Contains an inventory of evaluation reports produced by and for selected Federal agencies, including GAO evaluation reports that relate to the programs of those agencies.

Contains an inventory of evaluation reports produced by and for selected Federal agencies, including GAO evaluation reports that relate to the programs of those agencies.

In their first book, Safety Management Systems in Aviation, Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia provided a strong theoretical framework for SMS, along with a brief discourse on SMS implementation. This follow-up book provides a very brief overview of SMS and offers significant guidance and best practices on implementing SMS programs. Very specific guidance is provided by industry experts from government, industry, academia, and consulting, who share their invaluable insights from first-hand experience of all aspects of effective SMS programs.