An Institutional Assessment Of Antitrust Policy

Antitrust policy nominally plays an instrumental public interest role. The generally accepted notion is that it is a government instrument designed to intervene in relatively unregulated markets in order to preserve rivalry among independent buyers and sellers. Competition authorities are supposed to restrain business conduct that exercises monopoly power aimed at excluding competitors or exploiting consumers and clients. Thus it can be said – although few pro-market theorists make the insight explicit – that antitrust provisions reveal mistrust of the capacity of markets to promote social welfare. The inner logic, enforcement mechanisms, and practical outcomes of antitrust provisions are all intrinsically contradictory to the natural dynamic course of market functioning. In Dr. De Leon’s challenging thesis, this mistrust of the market lies at the root of antitrust policy, giving rise always to a preference towards ‘predicting’ the result of impersonal market forces rather than interpreting the entrepreneurial behaviour which creates those forces. And it is in Latin America that he finds the powerful evidence he needs to support his case. From the formative years of Latin American economic institutions, during the Spanish Empire, economic regulations – far from being driven by the pursuit of promoting free trade and economic freedom – have been conceived, enacted and implemented in the context of deeply anti-market public policies, trade mercantilism and government dirigisme. The so-called “neoliberal” revolution of the 1990s triggered by the Washington Consensus did not really change the interventionist innuendo of these policies, but merely restated the social welfare goal to be achieved: the pursuit of economic efficiency. Dr. De Leon presents his case against the assumption that consumer welfare orientated policies such as antitrust do really promote entrepreneurship and market goals. Paradoxically, antitrust enforcement has undermined the transparency of market institutions, in the name of promoting market competition. The author’s provocative analysis marshals several sets of facts in support of his thesis, including the actual functioning of antitrust policy as reflected in case law in various Latin American countries, the preference of merger control over other less intrusive forms of market surveillance, the constrained role of competition advocacy against government acts, and the ineffective institutional structure created to apply the policy. Among the many specific topics treated are the following: government immunity; strategic industries; state-owned enterprises; politically influential groups; measurement of market concentration; the burden of proof of social welfare benefits; the role of joint trade associations and professional guilds; institutional arrangements that favour collusion; selective distribution; sector regulation; erosion of property rights; marginal role of courts in the antitrust system; leniency programs; and privatized public utilities. The growing significance of Latin America in the context of economic globalization endows this book with huge international interest. Written by a leading authority on the topic, this is the first book that presents a detailed description of Latin American antitrust law and policy as it has been developed through numerous judicial opinions. A wide variety of audiences around the world will find it of extraordinary value: competition law specialists, scholars and students of the subject, policymakers and politicians in Latin America, as well as all interested lawyers, jurists, and economists.

This book challenges the received view about antitrust policy's alleged instrumental public interest role. The purpose of this book is to show why, contrary to conventional wisdom, antitrust policy does not support market institutions; on the contrary, it is rooted on antimarket traditions. The author highlights how the intellectual foundations of antitrust policy biases policymakers towards "predicting" the result of impersonal market forces rather than interpreting the entrepreneurial behavior which creates those forces. Conventional neoclassical economic science gears antitrust policymaking towards attaining a world free of "market failures," by its constant reference to "optimality" and "competitive equilibrium" models. This constructed perception of "optimal" markets reinforces the underlying economic culture of government dirigisme and trade mercantilism that has prevailed in Latin America throughout history, under a renewed "pro-efficiency" disguise. Ironically, by making policy enforcement unpredictable, antitrust policy is doomed to undermine the rule of law; hence, the very emergence of pro-market institutions in the region. In short, this book presents a case against the assumption that consumer welfare orientated policies such as antitrust do really promote entrepreneurship and market goals. Also, it advocates for a new "dynamic" understanding of markets, as a precondition for the design of pro-market competition policy making.

Antitrust policy nominally plays an instrumental public interest role. The generally accepted notion is that it is a government instrument designed to intervene in relatively unregulated markets in order to preserve rivalry among independent buyers and sellers. Competition authorities are supposed to restrain business conduct that exercises monopoly power aimed at excluding competitors or exploiting consumers and clients. Thus it can be said - although few pro-market theorists make the insight explicit - that antitrust provisions reveal mistrust of the capacity of markets to promote social welfare. The inner logic, enforcement mechanisms, and practical outcomes of antitrust provisions are all intrinsically contradictory to the natural dynamic course of market functioning. In Dr. De Leon's challenging thesis, this mistrust of the market lies at the root of antitrust policy, giving rise always to a preference towards 'predicting' the result of impersonal market forces rather than interpreting the entrepreneurial behaviour which creates those forces. And it is in Latin America that he finds the powerful evidence he needs to support his case. From the formative years of Latin American economic institutions, during the Spanish Empire, economic regulations - far from being driven by the pursuit of promoting free trade and economic freedom - have been conceived, enacted and implemented in the context of deeply anti-market public policies, trade mercantilism and government dirigisme. The so-called "neoliberal" revolution of the 1990s triggered by the Washington Consensus did not really change the interventionist innuendo of these policies, but merely restated the social welfare goal to be achieved: the pursuit of economic efficiency. Dr. De Leon presents his case against the assumption that consumer welfare orientated policies such as antitrust do really promote entrepreneurship and market goals. Paradoxically, antitrust enforcement has undermined the transparency of market institutions, in the name of promoting market competition. The author's provocative analysis marshals several sets of facts in support of his thesis, including the actual functioning of antitrust policy as reflected in case law in various Latin American countries, the preference of merger control over other less intrusive forms of market surveillance, the constrained role of competition advocacy against government acts, and the ineffective institutional structure created to apply the policy. Among the many specific topics treated are the following: government immunity; strategic industries; state-owned enterprises; politically influential groups; measurement of market concentration; the burden of proof of social welfare benefits; the role of joint trade associations and professional guilds; institutional arrangements that favour collusion; selective distribution; sector regulation; erosion of property rights; marginal role of courts in the antitrust system; leniency programs; and privatized public utilities. The growing significance of Latin America in the context of economic globalization endows this book with huge international interest. Written by a leading authority on the topic, this is the first book that presents a detailed description of Latin American antitrust law and policy as it has been developed through numerous judicial opinions. A wide variety of audiences around the world will find it of extraordinary value: competition law specialists, scholars and students of the subject, policymakers and politicians in Latin America, as well as all interested lawyers, jurists, and economists.

Provides a new conceptualization of competition law as economic inequality and its interaction with efficiency become of central concern to policy and decision-makers.

The book examines the potential for regional competition law systems as enforcement tools in developing countries, based on a case study of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the Andean Community and the Caribbean Community. It analyses the allocation of enforcement competences between the regional/supranational and the national level and formulates detailed guidelines on the optimal degree of centralization or decentralization. The book addresses all readers that are interested in the enforcement of competition law in developing countries. Moreover, it provides practical insights for public institutions that wish to identify or prevent possible misallocation of competences within regional competition law systems.

Under the purely economics-based approach to competition law, the central consideration is whether the conduct of undertakings has the effect of restricting competition or not. Such an ‘objective’ approach to antitrust enforcement leaves little room for subjective elements like intentions. But what happens when economic analysis reaches its limits? In this signal contribution, the author invokes the criminal law concept of mens rea, the idea of the ‘guilty mind’, thoroughly evaluating the normative cogency of mens rea evidence in the determination of antitrust infringements. Delving deep into the case law, the author views the subject from the standpoint of a confluence of various areas of law, including: the role of mens rea in the criminal law in France, Germany, and England and Wales; the different types of mens rea (e.g., intent, recklessness, negligence); mens rea in a corporate context; mens rea evidence in United States antitrust law; the notion of the ‘meeting of minds’ in Article 101 TFEU; relevance of intentions in the determination of the object of an agreement or concerted practice; relevance of intentions in the determination of abuse of a dominant position; and the role of mens rea in the determination of fines for antitrust breaches. The author also examines arguments both for and against the use of mens rea evidence in determining whether an antitrust infringement took place and how it should be punished. This is the first full-length assessment of what role mens rea evidence actually plays and should play in competition law even as the tools for antitrust analysis are meant to become increasingly objective. As a thoroughly researched and systematically presented commentary and analysis of the current status of the use of mens rea in antitrust enforcement and how the practice could develop, it is sure to be welcomed by practitioners as well as by policymakers and academics.

In this outstanding new book Professor Keith Hylton and his collaborators examine what antitrust law has become over the past ten years, a time in which economic analysis has become its undisputed core. What has become of the old antitrust doctrine, what are the new issues for the immediate future? This book brings together the leading experts to examine this silent revolution at the core of US domestic policy. Mark Grady, UCLA School of Law, US Hylton s Antitrust Law and Economics brings together many of the best authors writing in antitrust today. Their essays range widely, covering proof of agreement under the Sherman Act, group boycotts, monopolization and essential facilities, tying and other vertical restraints, and merger policy. The writing is clear, accessible but still technically sophisticated and comprehensive. This book represents the best in contemporary antitrust scholarship, by authors who understand and are able to communicate the centrality of economic analysis to antitrust. No antitrust lawyer, serious antitrust student, or antitrust economist should be without this book. Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa College of Law, US This comprehensive book provides an extensive overview of the major topics of antitrust law from an economic perspective. Its in-depth treatment and analysis of both the law and economics of antitrust is presented via a collection of interconnected original essays. The contributing authors are among the most influential scholars in antitrust, with a rich diversity of backgrounds. Their entries cover, amongst other issues, predatory pricing, essential facilities, tying, vertical restraints, enforcement, mergers, market power, monopolization standards, and facilitating practices. This well-organized and substantial work will be invaluable to professors of American antitrust law and European competition law, as well as students specializing in competition law. It will also be an important reference for professors and graduate students of economics and business.

If an EU industrial policy can be said to exist, its contours may be found in the complex and evolving concept of State aid. Because approaching any State aid issue can be fraught with multiple and sometimes conflicting interpretations, an in-depth analysis of the rationales, initiatives, and regulations that constitute the State aid system is much needed. In response to this need, this book provides a fine-grained clarifying context through which recent reforms, policy shifts, and judicial decisions concerning State aid can be understood and applied to specific situations. Focusing on the impacts of landmark cases and policy developments leading up to a deeply informed critique of the current State Aid Modernisation Programme, the authors cover such issues and topics as the following: – linkages to other established and evolving EU common policies and common strategies; – effect of EU State aid rules in the expanding geopolitical regions of EU influence; – interaction with the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement; – the problem of a ‘subsidies culture’; – how the European Commission’s notion of ‘bad’ State aid has evolved; – effect of EU policy imperatives (e.g., environmental goals) which implicitly argue for increased subsidisation; – nexus with EU tax harmonisation; – competition among undertakings versus competition among Member State policies; and – nature of the quasi-devolution of regulatory responsibilities to EU Member States. This book is a crucially important source of both theoretical enlightenment and practical wisdom that will greatly enhance confident progress through any legal matter involving EU State aid rules. It will prove of immeasurable value to practitioners, in-house counsel, policymakers, and academics for many years to come.