Anti Theory In Ethics And Moral Conservatism

This volume documents a movement from theory and rules in ethics to an account of morality based on local practice and perception of the particular case. The Introduction lays the foundation for this position, then the authors draw from the analytic tradition as they forcefully argue against theory derived from different philosophical ancestors. In the second half they examine moral conservatism, exhibiting how placing moral practice as primary does not restrict one to any form of political conservatism.

"This is a timely collection of important papers. It gives focus to a new development in moral philosophy, by defining the problems it addresses, by identifying the similarities and differences among various representatives, and by articulating the common themes which run through the works of these people." -- John Kekes "The book reveals an underlying unity to what might at first appear to be a diverse body of literature. The first section on "Anti-theory in Ethics" collects all of the most important contributions to the growing skepticism about moral theory as it is currently practiced. In itself it would make an interesting and useful collection. By combining it with the second section on moral conservatism, the editors reveal that the implications of the anti-theorists' arguments are not merely negative, and extend beyond the confines of methodological disputes in academic philosophy. The essays in part two both discuss moral conservatism and exemplify it; in so doing they reveal that attempting to build comprehensive theories is not the only way in which moral philosophy can be both rigorous and critical." -- Arthur Ripstein This volume documents a movement from theory and rules in ethics to an account of morality based on local practice and perception of the particular case. The Introduction lays the foundation for this position, then the authors draw from the analytic tradition as they forcefully argue against theory derived from different philosophical ancestors. In the second half they examine moral conservatism, exhibiting how placing moral practice as primary does not restrict one to any form of political conservatism.

Many well known philosophers defend the role of theory in ethics. They suppose that it is impossible to justify the moral rules and principles we live by without a theory being in place. They also argue that theorizing is needed in order to rationally generate new or modify old rules and principles. Anti-theorists argue that theories in ethics oversimplify matters and only give the appearance of being useful. The debate between the two sides seems not to be resolvable.

This title was first published in 2003. This book develops a moral ontology for a theistic ethic that engages the work of contemporary moral and political philosophers, and reaffirms the relevance of a theistic tradition of God's relation to the world reflected in the fundamental teachings of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Drawing on recent thought in the non-religious fields of psychology and political and moral philosophy, which build around the concept of human flourishing in community, Kirkpatrick argues that a theistic ethic need not be the captive of parochial or sectarian theological camps. He proposes a common or universal ethic that transcends the fashionable ethnocentric 'incommensurate differences' in morality alleged by many post-modern deconstructionists. In the wake of ethnic religious strife post September 11th 2001, this book argues for a common morality built on the inclusivity of love, community, and justice that can transcend sectarian and parochial boundaries.

Contemporary philosophers are increasingly sceptical toward both morality and moral theory. Some argue that moral theory is a radically misguided enterprise which does not illuminate moral practice, while others simply deny the value of morality in human life. The author responds to the arguments of both 'anti-morality' and 'anti-theory' sceptics.

Offers the first book-length discussion of debunking arguments in ethics and the reliability of moral judgment.

To be truly reflective, moral thinking and moral philosophy must become aware of the contexts that bind our thinking about how to live. These essays show how to do this, and why it makes a difference. Visit our website for sample chapters!

Ancient ethical theories, based on the notions of virtue and happiness, have struck many as an attractive alternative to modern theories. But we cannot find out whether this is true until we understand ancient ethics--and to do this we need to examine the basic structure of ancient ethical theory, not just the details of one or two theories. In this book, Annas brings together the results of a wide-ranging study of ancient ethical philosophy and presents it in a way that is easily accessible to anyone with an interest in ancient or modern ethics. She examines the fundamental notions of happiness and virtue, the role of nature in ethical justification and the relation between concern for self and concern for others. Her careful examination of the ancient debates and arguments shows that many widespread assumptions about ancient ethics are quite mistaken. Ancient ethical theories are not egoistic, and do not depend for their acceptance on metaphysical theories of a teleological kind. Most centrally, they are recognizably theories of morality, and the ancient disputes about the place of virtue in happiness can be seen as akin to modern disputes about the demands of morality.