Antitrust Federalism

The EU and the US are the preeminent examples of multi-level polities and both have highly developed competition policies. Despite these similarities however, recent developments suggest that they are moving in different directions in the area of antitrust federalism. This book examines multi-level governance in competition policy from a comparative perspective. The book analyses how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. Inspired by the increasingly divergent policy developments taking place on both sides of the Atlantic, the author asks whether the EU and the US can draw policy lessons from each other’s experiences in antitrust federalism. Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US reveals the similarities and differences between the European and American models of antitrust federalism whilst employing policy network models in its comparative analysis of issues such as opacity and accountability in networks. The book is essentially multidisciplinary in its effort to initiate dialogue between the Law and Political Science literatures in this field. This book will be of particular interest to academics, students and practitioners of Competition Law, Constitutional Law and Political Science.

This work examines the role that state antitrust law plays in our national competitve policy and surveys the similarities and differences between state and federal antitrust laws.

Moreover, states have powerful incentives to permit domestic industries to exploit outsiders, or even to facilitate such practices. High-profile antitrust conflicts, from the prosecution of Microsoft in state, national, and international forums to the transatlantic disagreement over the European Union's merger policy, illustrate the difficulties. Possible solutions to these problems range from improved intergovernmental cooperation, to direct policy harmonization, to a new regime of "structured competition" in antitrust policy modeled on U.S. corporation law.

Policy and Measurement: Basic Economics of Antitrust; History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy; Market Power and Market Definition; The Substance of Antitrust: Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly; Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and Rule of Reason; Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt; Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases; Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution; Mergers of Competitors; Conglomerate Mergers; Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act; Antitrust as a Regulatory Institution: Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws; Private Enforcement; Damages; Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government; Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy; Antitrust Federalism and the "State Action" Doctrine; Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws.

This text provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behaviour of the various US institutions that enforce antitrust laws. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the US, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions.