Aptitude For Destruction Case Studies Of Organizational Learning In Five Terrorist Groups

Case studies of the organizational learning activities of five major terrorist groups and a methodology for ascertaining what and why they learned.

Better ways are needed to understand how terrorist groups increase their effectiveness and become more dangerous. Learning is the link between what a group wants to do and its ability to actually do it; therefore, a better understanding of group learning might contribute to the design of better measures for combating terrorism. This study analyzes current understanding of group learning and the factors that influence it. It presents detailed case studies of learning in five terrorist organizations and develops a methodology for ascertaining what and why groups have learned, providing insights into their learning processes.

Continuing conflicts between violent groups and states generate an ever-present demand for higher quality and more timely information to support operations to combat terrorism. In particular, better ways are needed to understand how terrorist and insurgent groups adapt over time into more-effective organizations and increasingly dangerous threats. To adapt, terrorist organizations must learn. A group's ability to learn determines its chance of success, since learning is the link between what the group wants to do and its ability to gather the needed information and resources to actually do it. Despite the importance of terrorist group learning, comparatively little focused research effort has been directed at understanding this process and identifying the factors that influence group learning ability. While relevant data and insights can be found in the literature on terrorism and terrorist organizations, this information has not been collected and systematically analyzed to assess its importance from the perspective of efforts to combat terrorism. This study addresses that need in an effort to both analyze current understanding and stimulate further study and research in this area. The RAND Corporation conducted an analysis of organizational learning in terrorist groups and assessed its implications for efforts to combat terrorism. The work was performed between November 2003 and November 2004, a period during which the threat of international terrorism was high and concern about the capabilities of terrorist organizations and how they might change over time was a central focus of policy debate and U.S. homeland security planning. The study is described in this report and in "Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism, which applies the analytical framework described in the second part of this report to the practical demands of intelligence and law enforcement activities.

Better ways are needed to understand how terrorist groups become more effective and dangerous. Learning is the link between what a group wants to do and its ability to actually do it; therefore, a better understanding of group learning might contribute to the design of better measures for combating terrorism. This study analyzes current understanding of group learning and the factors that influence it and outlines a framework that should be useful in present analytical efforts and for identifying areas requiring further study.

In the world of terrorism, knowledge is a critical asset. Recent studies have revealed that, among international terrorists, there is a global sharing of ideas, tactics, strategies, and lessons learned. Teaching Terror examines this sharing of information in the terrorist world, shaping our understanding of, and response to, the global threat of terrorism. Chapters cover various aspects of individual and organizational learning, some using a general level of analysis and others presenting case studies of individual terrorist groups. These groups teach each other through a variety of means, including training camps and the Internet. Terrorist networks are also learning organizations, drawing on situational awareness, adapting their behavior, and, to give one example, improving not just their use of improvised explosive devices, but also rendering technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite phones ineffective. This book provides a wealth of insights on the transfer of knowledge in the world of terrorism, and offers policy implications for counterterrorism professionals, scholars, and policymakers.

This volume helps us understand the transformations of terrorist organisations, and the conflicts they are involved in, by broadening the perspective on what is considered terrorist learning. Using a variety of methodological approaches and empirical data, the volume offers a look at the clandestine inner lives of groups from different continents and ideological backgrounds in order to explore from whom they learn and how, and what the outcomes are. Their internal and external interactions are examined within their socio-political contexts to illuminate how they adapt to challenges or fail to do so. Unpacking the question of ‘how do terrorists learn’ helps us to grasp not only changes of violent means of action but also of operational and strategic approaches and, ultimately, even transformations of the ends pursued. The chapters demonstrate that terrorist learning is not principally different from that of other human organisations. The contributors draw on conceptual frameworks of organizational learning, but also broaden the scope beyond the organizational framework to acknowledge the variety of forms of informal and decentralized learning characteristic of much contemporary terrorism. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism studies, violent extremism, organisational studies and International Relations.

A serious look at the enemies we face in the twenty-first...

Although the United States has prioritized its fight against militant groups for two decades, the transnational jihadist movement has proved surprisingly resilient and adaptable. Many analysts and practitioners have underestimated these militant organizations, viewing them as unsophisticated or unchanging despite the ongoing evolution of their tactics and strategies. In Enemies Near and Far, two internationally recognized experts use newly available documents from al-Qaeda and ISIS to explain how jihadist groups think, grow, and adapt. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Thomas Joscelyn recast militant groups as learning organizations, detailing their embrace of strategic, tactical, and technological innovation. Drawing on theories of organizational learning, they provide a sweeping account of these groups’ experimentation over time. Gartenstein-Ross and Joscelyn shed light on militant groups’ most effective strategic and tactical moves, including attacks targeting aircraft and the use of the internet to inspire and direct lone attackers, and they examine jihadists’ ability to shift their strategy based on political context. While militant groups’ initial efforts to upgrade their capabilities often fail, these attempts should generally be understood not as failures but as experiments in service of a learning process—a process that continues until these groups achieve a breakthrough. Providing unprecedented historical and strategic perspective on how jihadist groups learn and evolve, Enemies Near and Far also explores how to anticipate future threats, analyzing how militants are likely to deploy a range of emerging technologies.