Aristotle S Theory Of The Syllogism

The present book is the English version of a monograph 'Die aristotelische Syllogistik', which first appeared ten years ago in the series of Abhand 1 lungen edited by the Academy of Sciences in Gottingen. In the preface to the English edition, I would first like to express my indebtedness to Mr. J. Barnes, now fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. He not only translated what must have been a difficult text with exemplary precision and ingenuity, but followed critically every argument and check ed every reference. While translating it, he has improved the book. Of those changes which I have made on Mr. Barnes' suggestion I note only the more important ones on pages 4, 12, 24sq, 32, 39, 6lsq, and 158. Since the second edition of the German text appeared in 1963 some further reviews have been published, or come to my notice, which I have 2 been able to make use of in improving the text of this new edition. I must mention here especially the detailed critical discussions of my results and arguments published by Professor W. Wieland in the Philosophische Rundschau 14 (1966), 1-27 and by Professor E. Scheibe in Gnomon 39 (1967), 454-64. Both scholars, while agreeing with the main drift and method of my interpretation, criticise some of my results and disagree with some of my arguments. It would not be possible to discuss these technical matters here with the necessary thoroughness.

Aristotle was the founder not only of logic but also of modal logic. In the Prior Analytics he developed a complex system of modal syllogistic which, while influential, has been disputed since antiquity—and is today widely regarded as incoherent. In this meticulously argued new study, Marko Malink presents a major reinterpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. Combining analytic rigor with keen sensitivity to historical context, he makes clear that the modal syllogistic forms a consistent, integrated system of logic, one that is closely related to other areas of Aristotle’s philosophy. Aristotle’s modal syllogistic differs significantly from modern modal logic. Malink considers the key to understanding the Aristotelian version to be the notion of predication discussed in the Topics—specifically, its theory of predicables (definition, genus, differentia, proprium, and accident) and the ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, and so on). The predicables introduce a distinction between essential and nonessential predication. In contrast, the categories distinguish between substantial and nonsubstantial predication. Malink builds on these insights in developing a semantics for Aristotle’s modal propositions, one that verifies the ancient philosopher’s claims of the validity and invalidity of modal inferences. Malink recognizes some limitations of this reconstruction, acknowledging that his proof of syllogistic consistency depends on introducing certain complexities that Aristotle could not have predicted. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic brims with bold ideas, richly supported by close readings of the Greek texts, and offers a fresh perspective on the origins of modal logic.

This study explores the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s theory of syllogism and his conception of demonstrative knowledge. More specifically, I consider why Aristotle’s theory of demonstration presupposes his theory of syllogism. In reconsidering the relationship between Aristotle’s two Analytics, I modify this widely discussed question. The problem of the relationship between Aristotle’s logic and his theory of proof is commonly approached from the standpoint of whether the theory of demonstration presupposes the theory of syllogism. By contrast, I assume the theoretical relationship between these two theories from the start. This assumption is based on much explicit textual evidence indicating that Aristotle considers the theory of demonstration a branch of the theory of syllogism. I see no textual reasons for doubting the theoretical relationship between Aristotle’s two Analytics so I attempt to uncover here the common theoretical assumptions that relate the syllogistic form of reasoning to the cognitive state (i. e. , knowledge), which is attained through syllogistic inferences. This modification of the traditional approach reflects the wider objective of this essay. Unlike the traditional interpretation, which views the Posterior Analytics in light of scientific practice, this study aims to lay the foundation for a comprehensive interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, considering this work from a metaphysical perspective. One of my major assertions is that Aristotle’s conception of substance is essential for a grasp of his theory of demonstration in general, and of the role of syllogistic logic in particular.

This book provides detailed treatment of topics in traditional logic: the theory of terms; the theory of definition; the informal fallacies; and division and classification. Aristotelian Logic teaches techniques for solving semantic problems — problems caused by confusion over terminology. It teaches the theory of definition — the different kinds of definition and the criteria by which each is judged. It also teaches that definitions are like tools in that some are better suited for a particular task than others. Several chapters are devoted to informal fallacies. A new classification is given for them, and the concept of proof is presented, without which some of the traditional informal fallacies cannot be explained adequately. Another chapter is devoted to division and classification, which occurs in all of the sciences. Other topics covered include the square of opposition, immediate inferences, and the syllogistic and chain arguments.

Syllogism is a form of logical argument allowing one to deduce a consistent conclusion based on a pair of premises having a common term. Although Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop this way of reasoning, he left open a lot of conceptual space for further modifications, improvements and systematizations with regards to his original syllogistic theory. From its creation until modern times, syllogism has remained a powerful and compelling device of deduction and argument, used by a variety of figures and assuming a variety of forms throughout history. The Aftermath of Syllogism investigates the key developments in the history of this peculiar pattern of inference, from Avicenna to Hegel. Taking as its focus the longue durée of development between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century, this book looks at the huge reworking scientific syllogism underwent over the centuries, as some of the finest philosophical minds brought it to an unprecedented height of logical sharpness and sophistication. Bringing together a group of major international experts in the Aristotelian tradition, The Aftermath of Syllogism provides a detailed, up to date and critical evaluation of the history of syllogistic deduction.

Aristotle was the first and one of the greatest logicians. He not only devised the first system of formal logic, but also raised many fundamental problems in the philosophy of logic. In this book, Dr Lear shows how Aristotle's discussion of logical consequence, validity and proof can contribute to contemporary debates in the philosophy of logic. No background knowledge of Aristotle is assumed.

Offering a bold new vision on the history of modern logic, Lukas M. Verburgt and Matteo Cosci focus on the lasting impact of Aristotle's syllogism between the 1820s and 1930s. For over two millennia, deductive logic was the syllogism and syllogism was the yardstick of sound human reasoning. During the 19th century, this hegemony fell apart and logicians, including Boole, Frege and Peirce, took deductive logic far beyond its Aristotelian borders. However, contrary to common wisdom, reflections on syllogism were also instrumental to the creation of new logical developments, such as first-order logic and early set theory. This volume presents the period under discussion as one of both tradition and innovation, both continuity and discontinuity. Modern logic broke away from the syllogistic tradition, but without Aristotle's syllogism, modern logic would not have been born. A vital follow up to The Aftermath of Syllogism, this book traces the longue durée history of syllogism from Richard Whately's revival of formal logic in the 1820s through the work of David Hilbert and the Göttingen school up to the 1930s. Bringing together a group of major international experts, it sheds crucial new light on the emergence of modern logic and the roots of analytic philosophy in the 19th and early 20th centuries.