Armed Servants

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.

Committee Serial No. 55. Investigates allegations of improper and inefficient utilization of military personnel. Focuses on proposal for use of civilian personnel for many noncombat military jobs and improper use of military personnel to perform personal services for superiors.

Private military firms are making a killing. They operate on all continents throughout the world—commissioned by governments, intelligence agencies, private industries, warlords, drug cartels, and rebel groups to support their military and safety interests. Here in the U.S., as the massively expensive war in Iraq shows no signs of ending, our forces grow more and more dependent on the assistance of military contractors. Beyond Iraq, engagements of mercenary firms in foreign countries are multiplying, whether to protect oil investments in the Nigerian delta or for humanitarian reasons in Darfur. In this far-reaching exposé, Rolf Uesseler reveals how these mercenary firms profit from conflict: As they operate in a legal twilight zone, the private nature of their work frequently makes them legally impermeable and financially profitable. Uesseler details the many ways in which employment of for-profit fighters compromises justice, jeopardizes international peace and stability, and manages to escape public scrutiny, explaining exactly what happens when military operations are shielded from democratic processes, and when the concern for justice and security is overshadowed by the desire for financial gain.

The Roman army represented an important social and organizational reference model for the Romano-Barbarian societies, which progressively replaced the Western Empire in the transition from Late Antiquity to Early Middle Ages. The great flexibility of the decision-making and organizational solutions used by the Roman army allowed the ‘new lords’ to readapt them and thus maintain power in early medieval Europe for a long time. From a perspective ranging from political, social and economic history to law, anthropology, and linguistic, this book demonstrates how interesting and fruitful the investigation of this specific cultural imprint can be in order to gain a better understanding of the origins of the civilization that arouse after the fall of the Roman world. Contributors are Francesco Borri, Fabio Botta, Francesco Castagnino, Stefan Esders, Carla Falluomin, Stefano Gasparri, Wolfgang Haubrichs, Soazick Kerneis, Luca Loschiavo, Valerio Marotta, Esperanza Osaba, Walter Pohl, Jean-Pierre Poly, Pierfrancesco Porena, Iolanda Ruggiero, Andrea Trisciuoglio, Andrea A. Verardi, and Ian Wood.

In uneasy partnership at the helm of the modern state stand elected party politicians and professional bureaucrats. This book is the first comprehensive comparison of these two powerful elites. In seven countries--the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands--researchers questioned 700 bureaucrats and 6OO politicians in an effort to understand how their aims, attitudes, and ambitions differ within cultural settings. One of the authors' most significant findings is that the worlds of these two elites overlap much more in the United States than in Europe. But throughout the West bureaucrats and politicians each wear special blinders and each have special virtues. In a well-ordered polity, the authors conclude, politicians articulate society's dreams and bureaucrats bring them gingerly to earth.

This book is the first of its kind to provide an in-depth treatment of the law of unauthorised disclosures in the United Kingdom. Drawing upon extensive data obtained using freedom of information as a methodology and examples from comparative jurisdictions, the book considers the position of civil servants, employees of the security and intelligence services and service personnel in the armed forces. It considers the protections available, the consequences of leaking and a full assessment of the authorised alternatives.