Asian Contagion

For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the Asian economic "miracle" has fueled the greatest expansion of wealth for the largest population in the history of mankind. In the summer of 1997, thirty years of economic boom came crashing back to earth. The reality of unrestrained speculation, inefficiently regulated currency exchange, banking instability and bad loans have struck the much-vaunted "Asian Tigers" like Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and, finally, Japan, casting a shadow of uncertainty on a region recently to the fore in the world economic system. Recovery depends largely on reform within the Asian economies themselves and a cold assessment of the structural weaknesses that lay under the surface, but only now have come to light. The implications for world economies and, more broadly, the dynamics of world politics, are tremendous.

For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the Asian economic "miracle" has fueled the greatest expansion of wealth for the largest population in the history of mankind. In the summer of 1997, thirty years of economic boom came crashing back to earth. The reality of unrestrained speculation, inefficiently regulated currency exchange, banking instability and bad loans have struck the much-vaunted "Asian Tigers" like Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and, finally, Japan, casting a shadow of uncertainty on a region recently to the fore in the world economic system. Recovery depends largely on reform within the Asian economies themselves and a cold assessment of the structural weaknesses that lay under the surface, but only now have come to light. The implications for world economies and, more broadly, the dynamics of world politics, are tremendous.

As the financial crisis swept the Asia-Pacific, China seemed to be the one economy in the region which had been left “largely unaffected” for various reasons, including its strong economic and financial fundamentals as well as its strong political will to defend the Renminbi, which had so far firmly stood the ground. However, China's economy ended 1998 with only 7.8% growth, slightly falling short of its officially pledged target of 8%. Though China in 1998 was still rated as the best-performing economy in the region, its economic growth momentum had visibly slowed down. The Asian contagion had finally caught up with China. It is not certain if the Chinese economy is entering a slower growth era though, in the short run, China can boost economic growth by expanding domestic demand. Slower economic growth for the country will have significant negative effects on its economic reform programmes and social stability. Contents:China and the Asian Financial Crisis: An UpdateChina's Economy in 1998 Readership: General. Keywords:

For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the Asian economic “miracle” has fueled the greatest expansion of wealth for the largest population in the history of mankind. In the summer of 1997, thirty years of economic boom came crashing back to earth. The reality of unrestrained speculation, misallocated private investment, fixed exchange rates, and inadequately supervised banks has struck the much-vaunted “Asian Tigers” like Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and finally, Japan, casting a shadow of uncertainty on a region recently at the forefront of the world economic system. Recovery depends largely on reform within the Asian economies themselves and a cold assessment of the structural weaknesses that lay under the surface, but only now have come to light. The implications for world economies and, more broadly, the dynamics of world politics, are tremendous.In Asian Contagion: The Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis, Karl D. Jackson, director of the Southeast Asia Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, has commissioned a group of leading experts on business and economic policymaking in Asia in an effort to provide the most up-to-date overview available on the Asian downturn. Each author considers one nation—Japan, China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam—and the country analysis is framed by an introductory chapter on the roots of the crisis. The chapters consider the most current economic statistics, but view them with an overriding attention to contextualization rather than a more perishable micro focus.

Currency and banking crises such as those originating in Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), and the Russian Federation (1998) tend to be associated and often take place together across countries. The East Asian experience was a fruitful laboratory for examining key questions. For example: How did contagion occur so extensively, and why was it so devastating? Did policy responses to crises and contagion minimize their impact on the real economy? What type of international financial architecture is needed to prevent and manage crises and contagion?

No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.

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