Asymmetric Warfare In South Asia South Asian Edition

A unique account of military conflict under the shadow of nuclear escalation, with access to the soldiers and politicians involved.

India is the world's tenth largest economy and possesses the world's fourth largest military. The subcontinent houses about one-fifth of the world's population and its inhabitants are divided into various tribes, clans and ethnic groups following four great religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. Framing the debate using case studies from across the region as well as China, Afghanistan and Burma and using a wealth of primary and secondary sources this incisive volume takes a closer look at the organization and doctrines of the 'shadow armies' and the government forces which fight the former. Arranged in a thematic manner, each chapter critically asks; Why stateless marginal groups rebel? How do states attempt to suppress them? What are the consequences in the aftermath of the conflict especially in relation to conflict resolution and peace building? Unconventional Warfare in South Asia is a welcomed addition to the growing field of interest on civil wars and insurgencies in South Asia. An indispensable read which will allow us to better understand whether South Asia is witnessing a 'New War' and whether the twenty-first century belongs to the insurgents.

This book examines the origins, courses and consequences of conventional wars in post-colonial South Asia. Although South Asia has experienced large-scale conventional warfare on several occasions since the end of World War II, there is an almost total neglect of analysis of conventional warfare in the Indian subcontinent. Focusing on China, India and Pakistan, this volume, therefore, takes a unique approach. Regional rivalries between India and Pakistan are linked with global rivalries between the US and USSR (later Russia) and then China, and war is defined in a broader perspective. The book analyses the conduct of land, sea and air warfare, as well as the causes and consequences of conflicts. Tactical conduct of warfare (the nature of mobile armoured strikes and static linear infantry combat supported by heavy artillery) and generalship are studied along with military strategy, doctrine and grand strategy (national security policy), which is an amalgam of diplomacy, military strategy and economic policy. While following a realpolitik approach, this book blends the development of military strategies and doctrines with the religious and cultural ethos of the subcontinent’s inhabitants. Drawing on sources not easily accessible to Western scholars, the overall argument put forward by this work is that conventional warfare has been limited in South Asia from the very beginning for reasons both cultural and realpolitik. This book will be of much interest to students of South Asian politics, security studies, war and conflict studies, military studies and International Relations in general.

India's continuing failure to devise credible conventional military responses to Pakistan's asymmetric provocations has seriously eroded the credibility of its deterrence. This could invite a serious escalation of the jihadi sub-conventional assault on India. It is not possible to fight a purely defensive campaign against an asymmetric war and prevail. The adversary can simply vary the targets of attack ad infinitum. Costs have to be raised for the aggressor by taking the war to his territory with proactive military responses that preempt such attacks rather than defending every possible target or carrying out legal enquiries post-strike. There is an urgent need therefore, to fashion an Indian Doctrine for Limited War that is credible, usable and ensures escalation dominance. To that extent, this study addresses a vital and urgent need. It is based on an empirical study of the South Asian experience of Limited War and relies heavily upon insights from India's recent military-historical experience. It examines the evolution and rationales for Indian concepts of fighting a Limited Conventional War against a nuclear backdrop. It is based primarily on a current literature survey and a purely analytical and non-experimental approach. It relies on published and unpublished sources as well as interviews/interactions with the military leadership involved in the formulation of these concepts. It is an essential reading for academics, policy-makers, defence personnel and scholars of strategic studies in general.

The advent of two nuclear powers in South Asia, discoveries of nuclear trafficking, and insurgencies and terrorism that threaten important U.S. interests and objectives directly have transformed the region from a strategic backwater into a primary theater of concern for the United States. The United States, to a great extent free of the restrictions of earlier sanction regimes and attentive to the region's central role in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), has engaged the states of South Asia aggressively with a wide variety of policy initiatives. Despite the diversity of policy instruments, few are very powerful; indeed, only the U.S. military seems to offer many options for Washington to intensify further its security cooperation and influence in the region. This monograph highlights key factors in the region that imperil U.S. interests, and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. The report notes that the current U.S. military force posture, disposition, and lines of command may not be optimal, given South Asia's new status in the U.S. strategic calculus, and suggests seven key steps the military might take to improve its ability to advance and defend U.S. interests, not only in South Asia, but beyond it, including the Middle East and Asia at large. Beyond the specifics, however, the broader message arising from this analysis is straightforward: the region's salience for U.S. policy interests has increased dramatically. It is therefore prudent to intensify Washington's involvement in the region and to devote the resources necessary to become more influential with the governments within the region. Given the area's potential for violence, it is also prudent to shape a part of the U.S. military to meet the potential crises emanating from South Asia, just as the United States once shaped its military presence in Western Europe for the contingencies of the Cold War.

The research reported here was part of a study called War and Escalation in South Asia, which was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Director of Plans (XOX); Commander Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF/CC); and Commander, Pacific Air Force (PACAF/CC); and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF). This monograph focuses on the highlights that emerged from an examination of the potential for regional conflicts, tensions, and instability in South Asia to endanger U.S. goals and objectives in the region and more broadly, U.S. equities in the Middle East and greater Asia. Because India and Pakistan are both nuclear weapon states with a long history of tensions and sporadic violence between them, much of the monograph focuses on their relations and the potential for future trouble. This study deals with other sources of friction and conflict, although in a more limited scope. The research should be of interest to anyone concerned with regional stability issues. Other recent RAND research on South Asia includes the following: The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, C. Christine Fair (MG-141-AF, 2004). This monograph examines U.S. strategic relations with India and Pakistan both historically and in the current context of the global war on terrorism. It concludes that the intractable dispute over the disposition of Kashmir remains a critical flashpoint between India and Pakistan and a continual security challenge and offers five policy options on how the United States might proceed.