Auctions

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1967.

This book provides an economic analysis of various aspects of ‘market quality’, a new concept which emerged in the 21st century, using the tools of ‘oligopoly theory’ and ‘auction theory’ that evolved over the 19th and 20th centuries. In the economics literature the link between the theories of oligopoly and auctions with market quality remains largely unexplored. This book attempts to forge such a link as it brings together relevant theoretical results in the literature on these topics under a unified framework. While the book is mainly theoretical in nature, it also discusses some specific issues related to the problems of market quality in emerging economies like India. Illustrated by carefully chosen examples, this book is highly recommended to readers who seek an in-depth and up-to-date integrated overview of the new field of market quality economics and are interested in some open research problems in this area. How should auctions and other allocation mechanisms be designed for oligopolistic industries to achieve such goals as efficiency, high-quality output and fast production? Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar’s book offers novel analysis of this question and also some interesting answers. Highly recommended. Eric S. Maskin, Nobel laureate in Economics