Aut Dedere Aut Judicare The Extradite Or Prosecute Clause In International Law

The aut dedere aut judicare, or “extradite or prosecute” clause is shorthand for a range of clauses that are almost compulsory in international treaties criminalizing conduct, obliging a State to either extradite or prosecute one accused of the crime the subject of the treaty. The obligation has become increasingly central in the emerging legal regime against impunity and has a role in States’ armoury of international criminal enforcement mechanisms. Yet there has been little academic consideration of the sources of the principle, including whether it exists at customary international law, and the scope and operation of the obligation. While the topic is currently being considered by the International Law Commission, this paper seeks to provide some of the empirical research that has to date been missing and to identify the sources and scope of the obligation to extradite or prosecute. The views reflected in this paper are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

The emergence of a global community is accompanied by a realization that greater cooperation is essential to its welfare. This is particularly true in the area of crime prevention and control. The increase in international, transnational, transboundary and national crime has contributed to a genuine growth in the body of international criminal law. The most effective way to combat such crimes is for states to accept an obligation to try international criminal law offenders before their own courts or surrender them for trial before the courts of another state or an international court. Until such time as an effective system of international criminal justice is established, the duty to prosecute or extradite will remain the foundation for international criminal law enforcement. This book examines in detail the variety of international instruments which impose a duty to prosecute or to extradite. It asks how far this duty goes and whether one aspect of this obligation supersedes the other, and whether it can now be regarded as an obligation imposed by general international law. In discussing these questions, the book provides a highly illuminating account of the basic postulates of international criminal law and their relationship to competing visions of the nature of the international legal order. There is an evident need for international law to settle some of these questions. The ICJ, for example, needs to address the question in the case brought before it by Libya against the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Moreover, it will be a question of some significance with respect to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Lastly, the prospect of a permanent international criminal court presently before the United Nations, is, in part, dependent on the effectiveness of aut dedere aut judicare. The two authors who address these difficult questions have contributed to the advancement of international law in general, and international criminal law in particular. They have produced a book which is a balanced blend of scholarly research and legal analysis.

This book contains an exhaustive analysis of extradition law and offers innovative perspectives thereon. It departs from both the classic paradigm and the mutual recognition approach, producing a new model based on respect for other States' criminal justice idiosyncrasies.

Prosecution of serious crimes of international concern has been few and far between before and even after the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002. Hope thus rests with the implementation of the international legal obligation for States to either extradite or prosecute such perpetrators among themselves or surrender them to a competent international criminal court. This obligation was considered by the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) which submitted its final report in 2014. Kittichaisaree, Chairman of the ILC Working Group on that topic, not only provides a guide to the final report, offering an analysis of the subject and a unique summary of its drafting history, he also covers important issues left unanswered by the report, including the customary international legal status of the obligation, the role of the universal jurisdiction, immunities of State officials, and impediments to the surrender of offenders to international criminal courts. Authoritative, encyclopaedic, and essential to those in the field, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute also offers practical solutions as to the road ahead.

Since the mid-19th century military powers and various writers have tried to define the notion of belligerent occupation and, in particular, the beginning thereof. There are many situations in which a state of occupation is controversial or even denied. When is control so effective that an invasion turns into a state of belligerent occupation? What is the minimum area of a territory that can be occupied; a town, a hamlet, a house or what about a hill taken by the armed forces? This paper examines what seems to be an important gap of the Fourth Geneva Convention: contrary to the Hague Regulations of 1907 it does not provide a definition of belligerent occupation. It is argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention follows its own rules of applicability and that therefore the provisions relative to occupied territories apply in accordance with the “functional beginning” of belligerent occupation approach from the moment that a protected person finds him or herself in the hands of the enemy. Henry Dunant Prize 2010 from the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (ADH Geneva)

This edited volume presents the most up to date topics of international criminal law and discusses possible future developments of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court.

'State sovereignty' is often referred to as an obstacle to criminal justice for core international crimes by members of the international criminal justice movement. The exercise of State sovereignty is seen as a shield against effective implementation of such crimes. But it is sovereign States that create and become parties to international criminal law treaties and jurisdictions. They are the principal enforcers of criminal responsibility for international crimes, as reaffirmed by the complementarity principle on which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based. Criminal justice for atrocities depends entirely on the ability of States to act. This volume revisits the relationship between State sovereignty and international criminal law along three main lines of inquiry. First, it considers the immunity of State officials from the exercise of foreign or international criminal jurisdiction. Secondly, with the closing down of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, attention shifts to the exercise of national jurisdiction over core international crimes, making the scope of universal jurisdiction more relevant to perceptions of State sovereignty. Thirdly, could the amendments to the ICC Statute on the crime of aggression exacerbate tensions between the interests of State sovereignty and accountability? The book contains contributions by prominent international lawyers including Professor Christian Tomuschat, Judge Erkki Kourula, Judge LIU Daqun, Ambassador WANG Houli, Dr. ZHOU Lulu, Professor Claus Kre, Professor MA Chengyuan, Professor JIA Bingbing, Professor ZHU Lijiang and Mr. GUO Yang.

This groundbreaking study seeks to clarify the concept of universal crimes in international law. It provides a new framework for understanding important features of this complex field of law concerned with the most serious crimes. Central issues include the following: What are the relevant crimes that may give rise to direct criminal liability under international law? Are they currently limited to certain core international crimes? Why should certain crimes be included whereas other serious offences should not? Should specific legal bases be considered more compelling than others for selection of crimes? Terje Einarsen (1960) is a judge at the Gulating High Court. He holds a Ph.D. (Doctor Juris) from the University of Bergen and a masters degree (LL.M.) from Harvard Law School.