Avoiding Inadvertent War

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

Since the dramatic end of the Pacific War in 1945 the threat of nuclear war has exercised the minds of many. Initial fears concerned the risk that a political crisis between the Superpowers would escalate through miltary confrontation into a 'calculated' nuclear war. Another scenario pictured a new Hitler commanding a nuclear-capable state prepared to use such weapons 'irrationally', possibly sparking a 'catalytic' nuclear war between the major Powers. More recently attention has shifted towards the risk of the 'accidental' release of nuclear weapons. While the risk of intentional conflict between the major Powers has lessened, the arsenals have only been marginally reduced, leaving the possibility of accidental release as perhaps the most threatening case. Inadvertent Nuclear War presents the risk in terms of the reliability and instability of the human and technical systems governing release, with contributions ranging from the engineering of computer software to the psychology of the chain of command. As Dr Wiberg states in his introduction, "No known technical construction, human being or social organization is absolutely failsafe."

Drawing on 11 case studies, beginning with the Crimean War and ending with the 1973 Mideast War, this volume presents an ambitious analysis of crisis management. The contributors analyze the role of factors such as intelligence, bargaining, rules, and stress. Throughout the volume, they attempt to grapple with the central problem facing experts on superpower relations today: how relevant is this kind of analysis to a post-Cold War environment? They conclude with possible future flashpoints, recommendations for containing escalation, and integrate the overall study's findings into existing theories of crisis behavior. They also make a convincing case that there are valuable lessons to be learned from past U.S.-Soviet crises. An epilogue touches on the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in 1990. ISBN 0-8133-1232-9: $59.95.

Drawing on 11 case studies, beginning with the Crimean War and ending with the 1973 Mideast War, this volume presents an ambitious analysis of crisis management. The contributors analyze the role of factors such as intelligence, bargaining, rules, and stress. Throughout the volume, they attempt to grapple with the central problem facing experts on superpower relations today: how relevant is this kind of analysis to a post-Cold War environment? They conclude with possible future flashpoints, recommendations for containing escalation, and integrate the overall study's findings into existing theories of crisis behavior. They also make a convincing case that there are valuable lessons to be learned from past U.S.-Soviet crises. An epilogue touches on the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in 1990. ISBN 0-8133-1232-9: $59.95.

This book constitutes the Proceedings of a meeting held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 18-20 July 1989, which was the eighteenth in a series of Workshops on Nuclear Forces held in the framework of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. This particular series of Workshops was initiated in January 1980, that is, immediately after the NATO double-track decision of December 1979 that in the short run led to the deployment in Europe of new US nuclear-armed missiles – ground launched cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles (Pershing II) – but that was also instrumental in setting into motion the process that led to the total elimination of all US and Soviet ground-based missiles having ranges from 500 to 5500km.

"Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament also provides information that is comprehensible to all readers. Jeffrey A. Larsen and James M. Smith present a context for the broader range of international relations at a given point in time, extending the utility of the dictionary beyond just a narrow examination of arms control."--BOOK JACKET.