Battle Of Mogadishu Anatomy Of A Failure

By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.

"By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters." -- Abstract.

By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. Gen. Hoar and Gen. Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TER operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred. While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TER conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters.

On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger was dispatched to seize two high-profile lieutenants of a Somali warlord. Special Forces troops were transported by ground vehicles and helicopters, and the mission was meant to be over within the hour. They quickly found themselves under heavy fire, and two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. With a hastily organized relief column many hours away, the American troops faced a desperate battle for survival. Focusing on the stories of the soldiers on the ground, and in the air, Day of the Rangers reveals the experiences and recollections of the Special Forces units, including the Rangers, Delta operators and Nightstalker crews who fought in the battle of Mogadishu. Published to mark the battle's 25th anniversary and using recently declassified documents and new interviews with many of the participants, Day of the Rangers is a fascinating and revealing new history of a battle that would influence American Special Forces for decades to come.

This book tells the story of Task Force Ranger – a unit of US Rangers and Special Forces – and their attempt to capture the lieutenants of the Somali warlord Muhamed Farrah Aideed, during the 1993 United Nations' humanitarian relief mission. What started as a simple snatch-and-grab mission quickly degenerated into a desperate battle for survival when US Black Hawk helicopters were struck by rocket-propelled grenades and crashed into the streets of Mogadishu. Racing to save the crew, Task Force Ranger was surrounded by mobs of hostile Somali gunmen. The battle in the city raged all night as the better-equipped and better-trained US forces kept the nearly overwhelming numbers of Somalis at bay. Finally, battered, bloodied, and low on ammunition, the Task Force was rescued by a combined UN and US relief force and extracted to safety. Containing detailed maps and declassified information, this is a dramatic retelling of a brutal battle that had a far-reaching impact on US military policy.

“A highly readable and well-documented account of the use and abuse of religion for violent political ends . . . This is a book well worth reading” (Timothy J. Demy, ThD, PhD, coauthor of In the Name of God). Most Americans could not fathom how Islamic terrorists could bring down the World Trade Center or an army psychiatrist could turn on his own soldiers, taking their lives in the name of his religion. How could an ex-army veteran blow up a federal building, or a Jewish doctor gun down Muslims at worship? None of these incidents fit our conceptions of the benevolence of religion. More importantly, is there something inherent within religions that justifies the taking of human lives? In Few Call It War, Dr. Robert Hicks explores these questions and takes the blinders off illuminating the roots of religious violence, what religious terrorists have in common, and how they differ. As Hicks points out, all major religions have used violence and terrorist methodologies at some points in their histories. Few Call It War reveals how the teachings of religious founders and the sacred writings attributed to them provide rich soil from which contemporary religious clerics and ideologues gain converts. If one is interested in gaining an answer to the question, “Of all the religions in the world, which are most prone to using violence?” Few Call It War provides a well-reasoned answer that is well worth the read. “A masterpiece in the study of religiously motivated terrorism. He has been fair in his critique of all religions, including movements within Judaism and even Christianity.” —Robert L. Brennemann, PhD, professor, Intercultural Studies, North Central University

Why, since the end of World War II, has the United States either lost every war it started or failed in every military intervention it prosecuted? Harlan Ullman's new book answers this most disturbing question, a question Americans would never think of even asking because this record of failure has been largely hidden in plain sight or forgotten with the passage of time. The most straightforward answer is that presidents and administrations have consistently failed to use sound strategic thinking and lacked sufficient knowledge or understanding of the circumstances prior to deciding whether or not to employ force. Making this case is an in-depth analysis of the records of presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama and Donald Trump in using force or starting wars. His recommended solutions begin with a "brains-based" approach to sound strategic thinking to address one of the major causes of failure ----the inexperience of too many of the nation's commanders-in-chief. Ullman reinforces his argument through the use of autobiographical vignettes that provide a human dimension and insight into the reasons for failure, in some cases making public previously unknown history. The clarion call of Anatomy of Failure is that both a sound strategic framework and sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstance that may lead to using force are vital. Without them, failure is virtually guaranteed.