Beyond Collective Action Problems

Human history is full of examples of continuously maintained shared infrastructure. Our ability to survive and prosper depends on cooperation at some level, from the irrigation systems that enabled ancient humans to abandon their nomadic lifestyle to the free and open-source software that undergirds the internet. Thus, understanding the conditions under which community governance can be both equitable and sustainable is of critical importance to scholars and policymakers alike. In Beyond Collective Action Problems, Atul Pokharel argues that sustained cooperation depends on user perceptions that the cooperative arrangement is fair. Pokharel elaborates a different way to think about sustained cooperation over decades, based on a follow-up of 233 long-running community managed irrigation systems in Nepal--the same cases that were used to understand how groups can overcome collective action problems. Covering nearly forty years of history through these cases, Pokharel introduces the idea of fairness problems to capture the many forms in which the perceived fairness of a form of governance comes to matter to continued cooperation. As he shows, the longer individuals cooperate, the more they become aware of how far their cooperative arrangement has diverged from the initial promise of fairness. This perception of fairness affects their commitment to maintaining the shared resource and participating in the institutions for governing it. Highlighting why eventually perceived fairness matters to sustained cooperation, this book illustrates how the fairness problem underlies successful cooperation over time, making it necessary to look beyond collective action problems.

In Beyond Collective Action Problems, Atul Pokharel argues that sustained cooperation depends on user perceptions that the cooperative arrangement is fair. Pokharel elaborates a different way to think about sustained cooperation over decades, based on a follow-up of 233 long-running community managed irrigation systems in Nepal. As he shows, the longer individuals cooperate, the more they become aware of how far their cooperative arrangement has diverged from the initial promise of fairness. This perception of fairness affects their commitment to maintaining the shared resource and participating in the institutions for governing it.

Beyond Turnout crafts a new theory that considers the downstream consequences of compulsory voting for both citizens and political parties. This theory is comprehensively tested through data from dozens of countries, with a particular focus on Argentina and Switzerland.

Public choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions. As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest. In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns. This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts.

The problem of collective action is that each group member wants other members to make necessary sacrifices while he or she 'free rides', reaping the benefits of collective action without doing the work. Therefore, no one does the work and the common interest is not realized. This book analyses the social pressure whereby groups solve the problem of collective action.

This book examines how nations and other key participants in the global community address problems requiring collective action. The global community has achieved some successes, such as eradicating smallpox, but other efforts to coordinate nations' actions, such as the reduction of drug trafficking, have not been sufficient. This book identifies the factors that promote or inhibit successful collective action at the regional and global level for an ever-growing set of challenges stemming from augmented cross-border flows associated with globalization. Modern principles of collective action are identified and applied to a host of global challenges, including promoting global health, providing foreign assistance, controlling rogue nations, limiting transnational terrorism, and intervening in civil wars. Because many of these concerns involve strategic interactions where choices and consequences are dependent on one's own and others' actions, the book relies, in places, on elementary game theory that is fully introduced for the uninitiated reader.

This Open Access book offers a novel view on the benefits of a lasting variation between the member states in the EU. In order to bring together thirty very different European states and their citizens, the EU will have to offer more scope for variation. Unlike the existing differentiation by means of opt-outs and deviations, variation is not a concession intended to resolve impasses in negotiations; it is, rather, a different structuring principle. It takes differences in needs and in democratically supported convictions seriously. A common core remains necessary, specifically concerning the basic principles of democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, and the common market. By taking this approach, the authors remove the pressure to embrace uniformity from the debate about the EU’s future. The book discusses forms of variation that fall both within and outside the current framework of European Union Treaties. The scope for these variations is mapped out in three domains: the internal market; the euro; and asylum, migration and border control.

Tackles one of the most enduring and contentious issues of positive political economy: common pool resource management.