Biosecurity In Uk Research Laboratories

Possessing the high containment laboratories necessary to tackle existing and emergent infectious diseases of both humans and animals is of the utmost importance to the UK. A leak of Foot and Mouth disease from such a laboratory at Pirbright in 2007 is the most recent demonstration of how devastating infectious disease can be. It is critical that such an incident does not happen again. This Report outlines a number of shortcomings in the way capacity for high containment research is provided and highlights where the Government should take action. Primarily, the Committee concludes that there is a striking lack of co-ordination between organisations who sponsor and run high containment laboratories. No one organisation or Minister has the remit to maintain a strategic overview of capacity and to co-ordinate these laboratories. There is significant potential for collaboration at a more formal level to assess what facilities are available and make best use of them, identifying any gaps. There is also room for more co-ordination and standardisation of the vetting and training of staff working in this area. The report identifies shortcomings in the funding of high containment facilities, particularly for the significant cost of ongoing maintenance. A number of high containment laboratories have been neglected and the funding situation is uncertain. The Government must ensure that dependable funding is provided to maintain such facilities safely. The new regulatory framework to be introduced in the wake of the Pirbright outbreak is a positive step and should provide a framework in which those operating high containment facilities, given sufficient resources, should be able to continue their work to protect the UK from the threat of infectious disease.

Biosecurity in UK research Laboratories : Sixth report of session 2007-08, Vol. 2: Oral and written Evidence

Government response to HC 360-I, session 2007-08 (ISBN 9780215521248)

During July 10-13, 2011, 68 participants from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, Turkey for a workshop organized by the United States National Research Council on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-containment Biological Laboratories. The United States Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program sponsored the workshop, which was held in partnership with the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The international workshop examined biosafety and biosecurity issues related to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of high-containment biological laboratories- equivalent to United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention biological safety level 3 or 4 labs. Although these laboratories are needed to characterize highly dangerous human and animal pathogens, assist in disease surveillance, and produce vaccines, they are complex systems with inherent risks. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics: Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals; Laboratory construction and commissioning; Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; and Measures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct. Workshop attendees described the history and current challenges they face in their individual laboratories. Speakers recounted steps they were taking to improve safety and security, from running training programs to implementing a variety of personnel reliability measures. Many also spoke about physical security, access controls, and monitoring pathogen inventories. Workshop participants also identified tensions in the field and suggested possible areas for action.

Biological safety and biosecurity protocols are essential to the reputation and responsibility of every scientific institution, whether research, academic, or production. Every risk—no matter how small—must be considered, assessed, and properly mitigated. If the science isn't safe, it isn't good. Now in its fifth edition, Biological safety: Principles and Practices remains the most comprehensive biosafety reference. Led by editors Karen Byers and Dawn Wooley, a team of expert contributors have outlined the technical nuts and bolts of biosafety and biosecurity within these pages. This book presents the guiding principles of laboratory safety, including: the identification, assessment, and control of the broad variety of risks encountered in the lab; the production facility; and, the classroom. Specifically, Biological Safety covers protection and control elements—from biosafety level cabinets and personal protection systems to strategies and decontamination methods administrative concerns in biorisk management, including regulations, guidelines, and compliance various aspects of risk assessment covering bacterial pathogens, viral agents, mycotic agents, protozoa and helminths, gene transfer vectors, zooonotic agents, allergens, toxins, and molecular agents as well as decontamination, aerobiology, occupational medicine, and training A resource for biosafety professionals, instructors, and those who work with pathogenic agents in any capacity, Biological safety is also a critical reference for laboratory managers, and those responsible for managing biohazards in a range of settings, including basic and agricultural research, clinical laboratories, the vivarium, field study, insectories, and greenhouses.

Over the past two decades bioscience facilities worldwide have experienced multiple safety and security incidents, including many notable incidents at so-called "sophisticated facilities" in North America and Western Europe. This demonstrates that a system based solely on biosafety levels and security regulations may not be sufficient. Setting the stage for a substantively different approach for managing the risks of working with biological agents in laboratories, Laboratory Biorisk Management: Biosafety and Biosecurity introduces the concept of biorisk management—a new paradigm that encompasses both laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. The book also provides laboratory managers and directors with the information and technical tools needed for its implementation. The basis for this new paradigm is a three-pronged, multi-disciplinary model of assessment, mitigation, and performance (the AMP model). The application of the methodologies, criteria, and guidance outlined in the book helps to reduce the risk of laboratories becoming the sources of infectious disease outbreaks. This is a valuable resource for those seeking to embrace and implement biorisk management systems in their facilities and operations, including the biological research, clinical diagnostic, and production/manufacturing communities.