Britain And The Cyprus Crisis Of 1974

This book examines the ideological and socio-political discourses shaping the remembrance and representation of Britain and the Cyprus conflict of 1974 within Greek Cypriot society. By combining the official with the popular and drawing on an extensive range of oral history interviews, this monograph shows that a suspicion born out of Britain’s long (neo-)colonial connection to Cyprus has come to frame the image and understanding of British actions associated with the events, and lasting consequences, of 1974. Indeed, with the island of Cyprus still divided, and the requirement to remember a national imperative, this book has a direct contemporary relevance. However, within the existent literature, while much has been written about the political roots of the Cyprus conflict, no study has yet sought to systematically analyse and understand the influences shaping the history and memory of British actions on Cyprus in 1974. One defined by the existence of 'partitionist' conspiracies, collusive accusations and a series of memory distortions which continue to resonate strongly irrespective of the evidence that is now available. As such, by analysing the influences shaping the image of Britain in 1974, one can begin to understand in ever greater detail the Anglo–Greek Cypriot relationship in a modern context.

America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: 'Responsibility without Power' critically examines the role of the British government during the first five days of the Cyprus Crisis. It evaluates the role played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and seeks to ascertain to what extent he was able to independently formulate and execute British foreign policy between the 15th and 19th July 1974.

This book examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. It considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the paper attempts to ascertain whether there exists any evidence to support the belief that either Britain or America or both were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as colluding with Ankara in its subsequent partition of the island.

This work casts light on the actions of the United Kingdom during the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64. In particular, the volume concentrates on a very specific period of events, charting the course of British actions from the start of fighting to the moment when UN Security Council Resolution 186 passed responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking over to the United Nations.As is shown, Britain actually undertook several different roles during this period. On the one hand, it was a crisis manager and peacekeeper. Its timely decision, along with Greece and Turkey, to establish a peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, certainly helped to limit the extent of fighting on the island, and thus reduced the chance of direct Turkish intervention. However, as this work shows, it was not an easy role to play and required a significant manpower commitment from the United Kingdom. On the other hand, Britain also tried to act as peacemaker. At first this was done informally on the island, but was later supplemented by a formal peace process in London. Unfortunately, the process failed in its objective and in doing so created a rift between Britain and the Greek Cypriots, which ended all hopes that Britain might be able to broker a compromise between the parties. It also affected Britain's efforts to find an alternative peacekeeping force to replace the Joint Truce Force - an effort that involved looking at the Commonwealth and NATO as possible peacekeepers. In the end, the United Nations was called upon to keep the peace, a role that is forty years old.However, the book also shows that the 1963-64 Crisis is profoundly important for two other reasons. First of all, it was during these months that the Greek Cypriots were accorded international legitimacy as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. As will be shown, this came about partly as a requirement of international peacemaking and peacekeeping. However, it also becomes clear that the actual confirmation of this recognition involved a certain amount of what the Turkish Cypriots see as betrayal - betrayal by Britain, by the United States, and, most surprisingly, by Turkey. Secondly, this period saw the acceptance by the international community of the legality of the Treaty of Guarantee. As a result, Turkey retained an internationally accepted constitutional right to intervene in the island's affairs. This right was put into effect in 1974 after a coup ordered by the then military government in Athens overthrew Archbishop Makarios, the first president of the independent state. As a result the island was divided and the more modern understanding of the 'Cyprus Problem' was created.Drawing on official British government documents and interviews with many of the protagonists of the period, this work is the first in-depth study of Britain's leading role during this critically important juncture in the modern history of Cyprus.

Focusing on the period from September 1964, when Senor Galo Lasso Plaza assumed the UN mediatory role, to the coup d'etat and the Turkish invasion ten years later, Cyprus Before 1974 seeks to unpick the internal conflicts which led to the failure of the peace process in Cyprus. Marilena Varnava studies three phases: Plaza's mediation of 1964-1965; the negotiating impasse on the island during the period 1965-1967; and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Varnava argues persuasively that each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably tied to political and social developments within the two main communities on the island itself. In particular, Cyprus before 1974 focuses on the events of 1968 - when the Greek-Cypriot political leadership, and the President of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III, failed to grasp the nature of the changes within the island's post-independence arena. Recurrent attempts within both communities during the talks of that year to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions served to heighten the barriers to a stable and peaceful outcome. This study enlarges our understanding of the underlying issues which the Turkish invasion of 1974 were to throw into stark relief and is essential reading for all those who study the Cyprus problem and conflict resolution.