British Nuclear Weapons

This book investigates the UK’s nuclear weapon policy, focusing in particular on how consecutive governments have managed to maintain the Trident weapon system. The question of why states maintain nuclear weapons typically receives short shrift: its security, of course. The international is a perilous place, and nuclear weapons represent the ultimate self-help device. This book seeks to unsettle this complacency by re-conceptualizing nuclear weapon-armed states as nuclear regimes of truth and refocusing on the processes through which governments produce and maintain country-specific discourses that enable their continued possession of nuclear weapons. Illustrating the value of studying nuclear regimes of truth, the book conducts a discourse analysis of the UK’s nuclear weapons policy between 1980 and 2010. In so doing, it documents the sheer imagination and discursive labour required to sustain the positive value of nuclear weapons within British politics, as well as providing grounds for optimism regarding the value of the recent treaty banning nuclear weapons.

The first British nuclear weapon test took place in Australia in October 1952. British nuclear weapons have been a source of controversy ever since. In this book, scientists, doctors, researchers and others assess the military value, political impact, health effects and legality of the programme.

The United Kingdom was the first country to undertake atomic energy research and development for military purposes. In April 1940 the British government commissioned a group of scientists to study the possibilities of manufacturing a ‘uranium bomb’ in wartime. Originally published in 1984, this book traces the development of British nuclear weapons from those early times to the present. It examines the decisions of Atlee and the MacMillan governments in sustaining the nuclear deterrent through the hydrogen bomb and the Polaris programme, and discusses in detail the decision to proceed with Trident. Throughout the narrative is set against the background of British domestic politics and Anglo-American relations. The book demonstrates why for nearly forty years British governments remained committed to an independent nuclear deterrent as the last line of defence should NATO fail.

This work examines British thinking about nuclear weapons in the period up to about 1970, looking at the subject through the eyes of the Royal Navy, in the belief that this can offer new insights in this field. The author argues that the Navy was always sceptical about nuclear weapons, both on practical grounds and because of wartime and pre-war experiences. He suggests that this scepticism can teach us a good deal about military technological innovation in general.

As Britain and the United States commemorate five decades of the special nuclear relationship embodied in the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA), two leading research institutes--one on either side of the Atlantic--have collaborated to examine that history. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, enlisted senior officials, scientists, academics, and members of industry who have been involved in the implementation of the MDA over the years. The contributors were asked to recount how the U.S.-UK nuclear relationship flourished despite such obstacles as the halt in the scientific cooperation that had spurred the Manhattan Project; the Suez crisis; and sharp disagreements over scientific, political, and technical issues. They were also asked to look to the future of this unparalleled transatlantic relationship. Abstracts from 36 oral histories (taken with, among others, Des Browne, UK secretary of state for defence; James Schlesinger, former U.S. secretary of energy; and Harold Brown, former U.S. secretary of defense) add to the historical dimension of this work. The resulting collection of histories, analyses, and anecdotes provides valuable reading for an understanding of how the two nations were drawn together by a common threat during a turbulent era, as well as how they will face future challenges in a radically changed security environment. -- Amazon.com.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland’s west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK’s complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons—internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

Based on a detailed analysis of archives and high level interviews this book looks at the role of beliefs, culture and identity in the making of British nuclear policy from 1945 through to the present day. This book also examines Britain's nuclear experience by moving away from tradtional interpretations of why states develop and maintain nuclear weapons by adopting a more contemporary approach to political theory. Traditional mainstream explanations tend to stress the importance of factors such as the 'maximization of power', the persuit of 'national security interests' and the role of 'structure' in a largely anarchic international system. This book does not dismiss these approaches, but argues that British experience suggests that focusing on 'beliefs', 'culture' and 'identity', provides a more useful insight and distinctive intepretation into the process of British nuclear decision making than the more traditional approaches.