British Policy In The Persian Gulf 1961 1968

An in-depth analysis of Great Britain's policy in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region during the last years of British imperialism in the area, covering the period from the independence of Kuwait to the decision of the Wilson Government to withdraw from the Gulf.

An in-depth analysis of Great Britain's policy in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region during the last years of British imperialism in the area, covering the period from the independence of Kuwait to the decision of the Wilson Government to withdraw from the Gulf.

This book examines how the rulers in the Persian Gulf responded to the British announcement of military withdrawal from the Gulf in 1968, ending 150 years of military supremacy in the region. The British system in the Gulf was accepted for more than a century not merely because the British were the dominant military power in the region. The balance of power mattered, but so did the framework within which the British exercised their power. The search for a new political framework, which began when the British announced withdrawal, was not simply a matter of which ruler would amass enough military power to fill the void left by the British: it was also a matter of the Gulf rulers – chiefly Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the ruling shaykhs of the lower Gulf – coming to a shared understanding of when and how the exercise of power would be viewed as legitimate. This book explores what shaped the rulers’ ideas and actions in the region as the British system came to an end, providing a much-needed political history of the region in the lead-up to the independence of the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar in 1971.

This book examines Iran’s policy in the Persian Gulf from 1968 to 1975 after the British military withdrawal from the region in 1971. It deals in detail with the questions of Bahrain and the Shatt-al Arab and examines the relationship of Britain’s ‘East of Suez Policy’ (1968-1971) to the politics of the region, and, especially, the role of Iran. Britain’s military pullout from the Persian Gulf influenced Iran’s determination to build a credible deterrent to replace the “power vacuum” without the intervention of foreign powers. The main factors which influenced Iran’s policy in the region were the Iranian oil industry, Persian Gulf security, Iran’s military preparedness and arms build-up.

Although Britain’s formal imperial role in the smaller, oil-rich sheikdoms of the Arab Gulf – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – ended in 1971, Britain continued to have a strong interest and continuing presence in the region. This book explores the nature of Britain’s role after the formal end of empire. It traces the historical events of the post-imperial years, including the 1973 oil shock, the fall of the Shah in Iran and the beginnings of the Iran-Iraq War, considers the changing positions towards the region of other major world powers, including the United States, and engages with debates on the nature of empire and the end of empire. The book is a sequel to the authors’ highly acclaimed previous books Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71 (Routledge 2004) and Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-war Decolonization, 1945-1973 (Routledge 2012).

The period from 1957 to 1988 was transformative for the international oil industry. The United Kingdon, home to two major oil companies, British Petroleum (BP) and Shell, as well as the possessor of large quantities of oil and gas in its territorial waters, was at the heart of this transition. While famous for its liberal policy toward oil and gas production, both before and after the discovery of North Sea oil and gas, this period actually saw the United Kingdom respond to shifts in power from the major oil companies to the oil-producing states, many of them in Organization of Petroleum Exporting Companies (OPEC), by building up its competency regarding oil matters. This took the form of efforts to influence the activities of BP and Shell abroad as well as in creation of a state-run oil company, the British National Oil Corporation, in an attempt to exercise greater state control over oil and gas production and distribution. The failure of these efforts was driven in part by internal divisions within Whitehall, the efforts of the oil companies themselves, and ultimately the political will of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher to get the state out of the business of oil and gas.

Half a century ago, Britain abandoned Aden, its last colonial outpost in the Arab world as its attempt to establish a new polity foundered amid a rising tide of Arab nationalism, tribal infighting and anti-colonial sentiment that eventually gave rise to the establishment of South Yemen. Yet just over three years later in 1971, a new state, the United Arab Emirates, emerged in Arabia, formed from the old Trucial states over which Britain had long held sway. At a time when state failure and fragmentation has become synonymous with much of the Middle East and where the very idea of sovereignty and legitimacy have become contested issues, this comparative historical study of the varied British attempts at state creation on the Arabian peninsula offers important insights into the limits of external ambition, as well as the possibilities that great power retrenchment offered to the peoples of the region. The legacy of British influence in Aden and Abu Dhabi still very much resonates today; this volume explains why. This book was originally published as a special issue of Middle Eastern Studies.

A reinterpretation of how Britain maintained order, protected its interests and carried out its defence obligations in the Gulf before its withdrawal from the region in 1971, benefitting from the extensive use of recently declassified British Government archival documents and India Office records.