Capital Inflows And Balance Of Payments Pressures

Although capital inflows are generally beneficial to recipient countries, they also pose a challenge for the conduct of economic policy. This paper proposes a conceptual taxonomy to guide the design of policy responses in the face of capital flows. We explore how responses to capital surges should be differentiated based on the source of balance of payments pressures. We also examine whether the policy choices in emerging market countries conform to the taxonomy's predictions and find some correspondence, especially during periods of high global liquidity.

Since 1990 capital has started to move from industrial countries to developing regions like Latin America, the Middle East and parts of Asia. Reentry into international capital markets is a welcome turn of events for most countries. However, capital inflows are often associated with inflationary pressures, a real exchange rate appreciation, a deterioration in the current account, and a boom in bank lending. This paper briefly examines how these inflows have altered the macroeconomic environment in a number of Asian and Latin American countries. The pros and cons of a menu of policy options are discussed.

This paper presents a new measure of capital flow pressures in the form of a recast Exchange Market Pressure index. The measure captures pressures that materialize in actual international capital flows as well as pressures that result in exchange rate adjustments. The formulation is theory-based, relying on balance of payments equilibrium conditions and international asset portfolio considerations. Based on the modified exchange market pressure index, the paper also proposes the Global Risk Response Index, which reflects the country-specific sensitivity of capital flow pressures to measures of global risk aversion. For a large sample of countries over time, we demonstrate time variation in the effects of global risk on exchange market pressures, the evolving importance of the global factor across types of countries, and the changing risk-on or risk-off status of currencies.

The Balance of Payments Textbook, like the Balance of Payments Compilation Guide, is a companion document to the fifth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual. The Textbook provides illustrative examples and applications of concepts, definitions, classifications, and conventions contained in the Manual and affords compilers with opportunities for enhancing their understanding of the relevant parts of the Manual. The Textbook is one of the main reference materials for training courses in balance of payments methodology.

This paper reports research on the impact of controls on capital movements on the private capital accounts of countries’ balance of payments using data drawn from 52 countries for the period 1985-92. The results indicate that: (1) capital controls operated by developing countries have not been effective in insulating the private capital accounts of these countries’ balance of payments, and (2) capital controls operated by industrial countries significantly affected the structure of their capital flows mainly by inhibiting net foreign direct and portfolio investment outflows. The results, which are consistent with other observations, raise issues for the policy toward the maintenance and liberalization of controls on capital movements by developing countries.

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.