Carnap S Early Conventionalism

Revision of the author's thesis--Oxford University, 1977. Bibliography: p.[142]-144.

This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World). It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to philosophy of science in the 1930s was largely an attempt to dissolve the tension in his early epistemology. This book fills a significant gap in the literature on the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It will be of particular importance to historians of analytic philosophy, philosophers of science, and historians of science.

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) is generally acknowledged to have been one of the central figures of twentieth-century philosophy. He was the leading philosopher of the Vienna Circle, a group that was central to the international movement known as logical empiricism, which pursued the goal of making philosophy scientific and eliminating metaphysics that went beyond the limits of what humans can coherently comprehend. Carnap was not only well-versed in this area of thought but also contrary ideas; he interacted philosophically with Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, and in his formative years he was influenced by the positivists Mach and Ostwald, neo-Kantians such as Cassirer and Natorp, and Husserl's phenomenology. Interest in logical empiricism waned in the decades following Carnap's death but was revived towards the end of the twentieth century; the wave of new scholarship that resulted identified Carnap as far more subtle and interesting than was previously understood. The complete fourteen-volume edition of Carnap's published writings builds upon these more recent interpretations of his philosophy. This first book contains Carnap's early publications up until 1928, none of which have previously been translated from their original German. The introduction and notes place the text in the relevant scientific and historical contexts, in addition to explaining obscure references or outdated notation and terminology. Carnap's neo-Kantian origins are more obvious in these works than in his later writings, and the overall figure which emerges from this volume is a very different Carnap to the caricature that many philosophers will know.

The continuing philosophical interest in the famous 'Protocol Sentence Debate' in the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists is, to a large measure, due to the focus on the epistemological issues in the dispute, and the neglect of differences among the leading players in their philosophical views of logic and language. In Protocols, Truth and Convention, the current understanding of the debate is advanced by developing the contemporaneous views of logic and language held by the principal disputants. Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. It is argued - largely on the basis of unpublished manuscripts and correspondence - that, despite apparent differences in their respective conceptions of language, there are nonetheless striking similarities, particularly with respect to the conventionality of language. Nonetheless, one key issue - concerning the syntacticism inherent in Carnap's early Thirties' philosophy - separates the two viewpoints in the clash over protocols. Finally, it is argued that Carnap's syntacticism is untenable, a conclusion that Carnap himself finally reached in the closing exchanges of the protocol sentence controversy.

Section Guide 1. Prolegomena 2. Biographical Sketch 3. Epistemology 4. Textbook Ontology 1. PROLEGOMENA While both philosophers and historians almost always love truth and the search for truth, and both often carry out extensive research, there can be noticeable differences when historians write about the history of philosophy and when philosophers write about it. Philosophers often look at the past with categories and interests taken from the present or at the least from the recent past, but many historians, especially those who love research for its own sake, will try to look at the past from a perspective either from that period or from even earlier. Both camps look for roots, but view them with different lenses and presupposi tions. This prolegomena has been added to prepare some philosophers for what will hopefully only be the mildest of shocks, for seeing the history of philosophy in a way which does not treat what is recent or latest as best, but which loves the context of ideas for its own sake, a context which can be very foreign to contemporary likes and dislikes. To be sure, we historians can deceive ourselves as easily as philosophers, but we tend to do so about different things.

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This book provides a comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincaré's geometric conventionalism. She argues that the radical extrapolations of Poincaré's ideas by later thinkers, including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Carnap, eventually led to the decline of conventionalism. This book provides a fresh perspective on twentieth-century philosophy. Many of the major themes of contemporary philosophy emerge in this book as arising from engagement with the challenge of conventionalism.

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was the most important philosopher of the movement known as logical empiricism or logical positivism, still the basis of much modern analytic philosophy. It was long thought that this movement had been destroyed by the polemics of Quine, Popper, and Kuhn. But recently, leading philosophers have been re-appraising this verdict. It is no longer universally agreed that Quine or Popper "won" their disputes with Carnap, and some have now been arguing that Kuhn's ideas are--as Carnap himself thought--perfectly compatible with logical empiricism. This volume presents the latest contributions to this discussion from both sides, and adds a number of new voices, who look at Carnap from a more international point of view -- bringing out, for instance, the roots of his thought in Continental neo-Kantianism and Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie, and stressing his deep commitment to political and cultural change. Carnap grew up in Jena, and in his student days was an active member there of the utopian "Sera Group", part of the German youth movement. At the same time, he was one of Frege's few students, and was deeply influenced by him.