Castles Battles Bombs

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq. "In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly "This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

From the walls of Troy to the sands of Iraq, humans have devoted staggering resources to the art and science of war. Yet while military history has long studied the economics of conflict, until now there have been few attempts to apply the principles of economics to military history.In "Castles, Battles, and Bombs", Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll reconsider key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics - with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army.Similarly, great commanders of the Age of Battle such as Napoleon, Marlborough, and Frederick the Great are shown to have engaged in cost-benefit calculations: because the risk of losing an entire army usually far outweighed the potential spoils of victory, they actually chose to fight relatively few large engagements. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France's decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and van Tuyll suggest lessons for today's military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.Innovative and thought-provoking - and written to be grasped by readers without a background in economics - "Castles, Battles, and Bombs" opens up a new perspective on war and strategy, sure to fascinate history buffs, scholars, and students alike.

From the walls of Troy to the sands of Iraq, humans have devoted staggering resources to the art and science of war. Yet while military history has long studied the economics of conflict, until now there have been few attempts to apply the principles of economics to military history. In Castles, Battles, and Bombs, Jurgen Brauer and Hubert van Tuyll reconsider key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics--with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: thoug.

This riveting tale of heroism and patriotism tells the full story of a covert military operation in Laos that resulted in the largest ground combat loss of U.S. Air Force personnel during the Vietnam War.

This book provides a new quantitative view of the wartime economic experiences of six great powers; the UK, the USA, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. What contribution did economics made to war preparedness and to winning or losing the war? What was the effect of wartime experiences on postwar fortunes, and did those who won the war lose the peace? A chapter is devoted to each country, reviewing its economic war potential, military-economic policies and performance, war expenditures and development, while the introductory chapter presents a comparative overview. The result of an international collaborative project, the volume aims to provide a text of statistical reference for students and researchers interested in international and comparative economic history, the history of World War II, the history of economic policy, and comparative economic systems. It embodies the latest in economic analysis and historical research.

Renowned for its accuracy, brevity, and readability, this book has long been the gold standard of concise histories of the Napoleonic Wars. Now in an updated and revised edition, it is unique in its portrayal of one of the world's great generals as a scrambler who never had a plan, strategic or tactical, that did not break down or change of necessity in the field. Distinguished historian Owen Connelly argues that Napoleon was the master of the broken play, so confident of his ability to improvise, cover his own mistakes, and capitalize on those of the enemy that he repeatedly plunged his armies into uncertain, seemingly desperate situations, only to emerge victorious as he "blundered" to glory. Beginning with a sketch of Napoleon's early life, the book progresses to his command of artillery at Toulon and the "whiff of grapeshot" in Paris that netted him control of the Army of Italy, where his incredible performance catapulted him to fame. The author vividly traces Napoleon's campaigns as a general of the French Revolution and emperor of the French, knowledgeably analyzing each battle's successes and failures. The author depicts Napoleon's "art of war" as a system of engaging the enemy, waiting for him to make a mistake, improvising a plan on the spot-and winning. Far from detracting from Bonaparte's reputation, his blunders rather made him a great general, a "natural" who depended on his intuition and ability to read battlefields and his enemy to win. Exploring this neglected aspect of Napoleon's battlefield genius, Connelly at the same time offers stirring and complete accounts of all the Napoleonic campaigns.

Tennozan offers a remarkable account of the battle of Okinawa, the largest land-sea-air engagement in history. It examines the disastrous collision of three disparate cultures--American, Japanese, and Okinawan--and provides the context for understanding the decision to drop the atomic bomb. 41 photographs.

Slavery is back. America, 1962. Having lost a war, America finds itself under Nazi Germany and Japan occupation. A few Jews still live under assumed names. The 'I Ching' is prevalent in San Francisco. Science fiction meets serious ideas in this take on a possible alternate history.