Cause Mind And Reality

In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings-on in the brain constitute -- literally are -- conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them.

Does the brain create the mind, or is some external entity involved? This book synthesizes ideas borrowed from philosophy, religion, and science. Topics range widely from brain imagining of thought processes to quantum mechanics and the essential role of information in brains and physical systems.

T is said that there is no progress in philosophy. The illusion of standing I still, however, arises only when we lose sight of our history and so fail to notice the distance we have travelled. Philosophers nowadays find obvious ideas and themes that, as it happens, emerged slowly and painfully and largely in reaction to prevailing sensibilities. The essays here honour a man to whom present-day philosophy owes much: Charles Burton Martin. In reflecting on my own on-going and somewhat chaotic philosophical education, I find considerable evidence of Charlie Martin's influence. After departing graduate school, one of the first papers I succeeded in publishing consisted of an attack on Martin and Deutscher's 'Remembering'. ' After that, Charlie more or less vanished from my conscious awareness until the winter of 1985, when we appeared together in a colloquium at the Eastern Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association. Although Charlie was nominally a commentator on a paper I was delivering, his 'comments' contained more philosophy and went considerably beyond the tentative and highly circumscribed thesis I had elected to defend. Whereas my focus had been on a tiny feature of Hilary Putnam's argument against realism, Charlie went straight for the jugular, addressing matters that immediately took us into deep water.

Written by one of the world’s leading neuroscientists, Making Up the Mind is the first accessible account of experimental studies showing how the brain creates our mental world. Uses evidence from brain imaging, psychological experiments and studies of patients to explore the relationship between the mind and the brain Demonstrates that our knowledge of both the mental and physical comes to us through models created by our brain Shows how the brain makes communication of ideas from one mind to another possible

This book collects some of McDowell’s most influential papers of the last two decades. The essays deal with themes such as the interpretation of Aristotle’s and Plato’s ethical writings, questions in moral philosophy that arise out of the Greek tradition, Wittengensteinian ideas about reason in action, and issues central to philosophy of mind.

A groundbreaking popular psychology book that explores the deep connection between our body and our brain. Over decades of study, University of Virginia psychologist Dennis Proffitt has shown that we are each living our own personal version of Gulliver’s Travels, where the size and shape of the things we see are scaled to the size of our bodies, and our ability to interact with them. Stairs look less steep as dieters lose weight, baseballs grow bigger the better players hit, hills look less daunting if you’re standing next to a close friend, and learning happens faster when you can talk with your hands. Written with journalist Drake Baer, Perception marries academic rigor with mainstream accessibility. The research presented and the personalities profiled will show what it means to not only have, but be, your unique human body. The positive ramifications of viewing ourselves from this embodied perspective include greater athletic, academic, and professional achievement, more nourishing relationships, and greater personal well-being. The better we can understand what our bodies are—what they excel at, what they need, what they must avoid—the better we can live our lives.

This book is the first volume featuring the work of American women philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century. It provides selected papers authored by Mary Whiton Calkins, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Grace Neal Dolson, Marjorie Glicksman Grene, Marjorie Silliman Harris, Thelma Zemo Lavine, Marie Collins Swabey, Ellen Bliss Talbot, Dorothy Walsh and Margaret Floy Washburn. The book also provides the historical and philosophical background to their work. The papers focus on the nature of philosophy, knowledge, the philosophy of science, the mind-matter nexus, the nature of time, and the question of freedom and the individual. The material is suitable for scholars, researchers and advanced philosophy students interested in (history of) philosophy; theories of knowledge; philosophy of science; mind, and reality.

Confabulation denotes the recitation of memories about events and experiences that never happened. Based on multiple case examples, The Confabulating Mind provides an in-depth review of the presentations, the causative diseases, and the mechanisms of this phenomenon and compares confabulation with normal false memories, as they occur in healthy adults and children. Memory-related confabulations are compared with false statements made by patients who confuse people, places, or their own health status, as this happens in disorders like déjà vu, paramnesic misidentification, and anosognosia.