Central Bank Emergency Support To Securities Markets

This paper considers the central bank mandate with respect to financial stability and identifies the links to the functioning of securities markets. It argues that while emergency support to securities markets is an important part of the crisis management response, a high bar should be set for its use. Importantly, it should be used only as part of a comprehensive policy package. The paper considers what types of securities markets may be important for financial stability, what market conditions could trigger emergency support measures, and how programs can be designed to restore market functioning while minimizing moral hazard.

This paper examines emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) central bank interventions to maintain financial stability during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through empirical analysis and case study reviews, it identifies lessons for designing future programs to address challenges faced in EMDEs, including less-developed financial markets and lower levels of institutional credibility. The focus is on the functioning of the financial markets that are key to maintaining financial stability—money, securities, and FX funding markets. Several lessons emerge, including: (i) objectives should be well-specified and communicated to facilitate eventual exit; (ii) intervention triggers should prioritize liquidity metrics over prices; (iii) actions should be sufficiently large to address market dysfunction; (iv) the risks of fiscal dominance and moral hazard should be minimized; and (v) program design should incentivize self-liquidation by appropriate pricing or through short-term operations that quickly liquidate. While interventions may increase risks to central bank balance sheets, potentially challenging policy solvency and operational independence, a well-designed framework can significantly mitigate these risks.

What is the role of central banks in ensuring financial stability? This paper addresses this controversial subject, in part by drawing on the experiences in Europe, Japan, and the United States, and by examining four questions. What is meant by financial stability? Do central banks have a natural role in ensuring financial stability? What does a central bank need to execute this role effectively? How far have central banks actually gone in safeguarding financial stability? The experience drawn on in the paper suggest that central banks: have a natural role to play; at times may require supervisory information to execute this natural role; and have incurred risks to their balance sheets to ensure financial stability.

In an indirect monetary policy framework, open market operations become the central bank’s main instrument. In the initial stages, when financial markets are still undeveloped, selection of a financial instrument for those operations and the design of supporting arrangements to ensure the central bank’s operational autonomy when using the instrument, are crucial issues. Based on theoretical arguments and experience of a sample of countries that embarked on financial reforms, this paper argues that government securities are the preferred instrument because of their better capacity to develop financial markets. The use of government securities, however, requires the most complex supporting arrangements.

This paper considers the central bank mandate with respect to financial stability and identifies the links to the functioning of securities markets. It argues that while emergency support to securities markets is an important part of the crisis management response, a high bar should be set for its use. Importantly, it should be used only as part of a comprehensive policy package. The paper considers what types of securities markets may be important for financial stability, what market conditions could trigger emergency support measures, and how programs can be designed to restore market functioning while minimizing moral hazard.

The global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed interest in emergency liquidity support (sometimes referred to as “Lender of Last Resort”) provided by central banks to financial institutions and challenged the traditional way of conducting these operations. Despite a vast literature on the topic, central bank approaches and practices vary considerably. In this paper we focus on, for the most part, the provision of idiosyncratic support, approaching it from an operational perspective; highlighting different approaches adopted by central banks; and also identifying some of the issues that arose during the GFC.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

This Financial System Stability Assessment paper discusses that Canada has enjoyed favorable macroeconomic outcomes over the past decades, and its vibrant financial system continues to grow robustly. However, macrofinancial vulnerabilities—notably, elevated household debt and housing market imbalances—remain substantial, posing financial stability concerns. Various parts of the financial system are directly exposed to the housing market and/or linked through housing finance. The financial system would be able to manage severe macrofinancial shocks. Major deposit-taking institutions would remain resilient, but mortgage insurers would need additional capital in a severe adverse scenario. Housing finance is broadly resilient, notwithstanding some weaknesses in the small non-prime mortgage lending segment. Although banks’ overall capital buffers are adequate, additional required capital for mortgage exposures, along with measures to increase risk-based differentiation in mortgage pricing, would be desirable. This would help ensure adequate through-the cycle buffers, improve mortgage risk-pricing, and limit procyclical effects induced by housing market corrections.