Chemical Weapons In Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet Military Strategy in Europe focuses on the development, form and content, implications for international relations, and goal of Soviet military plan in Europe. The book first discusses the foundation of Soviet military thought and revolution in Soviet military affairs, including basic concepts of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Soviet study of military affairs, nuclear revolution, and scientific and technical revolution. The publication also concentrates on Soviet study of laws and principles of military art and forces and primary operational concepts. Topics include laws of the first order, naval and air operations, nuclear strike, and conventional war considerations. The manuscript ponders on command and control, as well as combat modeling, survivability, coordination, centralization, and attack of NATO command and control. The book also reviews the issues of Soviet military strategy toward Europe and special Soviet problems. Topics include role of nuclear weapons, chemical warfare options, escalation to intercontinental war, NATO nuclear threat, nuclear weapon stockpile, and superiority and war initiation. The publication is a dependable reference for readers interested in the Soviet military scheme in Europe.

Om den stigende brug af sovjetisk fremstillede biologiske og kemiske våben, dels anvendt af Sovjetunionen, USSR selv, både individuelt i form af personlikvideringer hos KGB, og dels som massevåben mod den afghanske befolkning.

This book, first published in 1954, is a key analysis of the guiding policies, basic assumptions, fundamental principles and methods of the Red Army, in many respects the most powerful force in the Cold War. This analysis examines the strategy and tactics, weapons systems, training, discipline and political doctrine of the Red Army, as well as focusing on the political control of the USSR and its satellite states.

In the new era, the United States need not rely on nuclear weapons to prevent a global challenger from upsetting the status quo, to compensate for weakness in conventional defense, or to impress others with its power. Although the threat of nuclear response to conventional attack is no longer crucial to U.S. strategy, rogue states might adopt this tactic to deter U.S. power projection. However, the United States needs nuclear weapons to deter nuclear and biological attack, which could be just as deadly and might not be deterred by threat of U.S. conventional retaliation. The United States could reduce the importance and attractiveness of nuclear weapons, delegitimize their use in response to conventional threats, sharpen nuclear deterrence against biological weapons by stating nuclear weapons would be used only in retaliation for attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--in essence, a "no-first-use-of-WMD" policy.