Chemical Weapons Inspections In Iraq

This book describes the problems encountered by UN inspection teams assigned to find and destroy Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile capabilities following Desert Storm. Kathleen C. Bailey focuses on the initial inspections—the period in which Iraq was struggling to camouflage and conceal its weapons and production equipment as inspectors were trying to define their role in the process. Working from interviews with these initial inspectors, Bailey extracts important lessons for future verification efforts. On-site arms control inspectors in Iraq found information to be carefully controlled by the government. Pertinent documentation was destroyed, only selected people were allowed to interact with inspectors, and officials refused to make full, complete declarations. Buildings were tom down, equipment was moved, and un-exploded ordnance was placed in the way. These and other techniques helped Iraq to hide its past activities and to preserve some of its weapons capabilities. In the future, arms control inspectors will need to develop strategies for dealing more effectively with recalcitrant inspectees and for creating the best possible procedures and processes. Bailey concludes with concrete suggestions for overcoming some of these obstacles with more effective inspection practices.

This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.

Report released by Prime Minister Tony Blair detailing information regarding Iraq's current chemical and biological weapons programs.

Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes—the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future.

Discusses the first Gulf War, the weapons inspections, and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, all in an effort to protect the region and the world from weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled. Iraq largely has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production. Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents. Although Saddam probably does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material. If Baghdad acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year.

Contents of this report that was compiled for Congress: (1) History of Weapons Inspections in Iraq; (2) Human Rights/War Crimes Issues; (3) Support for International Terrorism; and (4) Iraq-Kuwait Issues.