China Diplomacy 1914 1918

Preliminary Material -- War Spreads to the Far East -- Japan Bids for Supremacy in China -- Yuan Shih-ka'i Aspires to be Emperor -- European Containment -- American Compromise -- China Enters the War -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- Harvard East Asian Monographs.

This study of World War I diplomacy concerning China covers in detail the outbreak of the war in the Far East; China's attempt to join the allies in 1915; the secret agreements during 1917 between Japan and Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia; and later negotiations relative to China's entry into the war.

Publisher Description

This book attempts to explain this aspect of Yüan Shih-k'ai's political power by analysing the relationship between him and Sir John Newell Jordan, British minister at Peking from 1906 to 1920.

First Published in 1981. Contrary to Chairman Mao's assertion that political power comes from the barrel of a gun, this study contends that political power in China in the early 1920s emanated from the boardrooms of foreign banks. The author's interest in the way financial concerns have shaped foreign policy began with the discovery that the Lloyd George government attempted to influence the American government's policy on the British war debts by offering concessions concerning the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This study should provide understanding concerning the causes of Chinese bitterness as well as suggest the conflicts experienced by diplomats in balancing public and private interests.

The twelve essays in this volume underscore the similarities between Chinese and American approaches to bilateral diplomacy and between their perceptions of each other’s policy-making motivations. Much of the literature on U.S.–China relations posits that each side was motivated either by ideologically informed interests or by ideological assumptions about its counterpart. But as these contributors emphasize, newly accessible archives suggest rather that both Beijing and Washington developed a responsive and tactically adaptable foreign policy. Each then adjusted this policy in response to changing international circumstances and changing assessments of its counterpart’s policies. Motivated less by ideology than by pragmatic national security concerns, each assumed that the other faced similar considerations.