China S New World Order

This discerning book examines China’s newly developed soft-intervention policy towards North Korea, Myanmar and the two Sudans by examining China’s diplomatic statements and behaviours. It also highlights the Chinese soft-intervention policy in economic manipulation and diplomatic persuasion in the recent generations of Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

Get the inside story from a Chinese journalist/consultant about China's surge under globalization and capitalism. This second volume of a trilogy covers (1) political-economic trends; (2) Chinese multinationals vs. global giants; (3) trade, the yuan, banking, insurance, and the stock market; and (4) issues with Taiwan, the West, India, and Japan.

Analysing the transformations that China has undertaken since 1989, Wang Hui argues that it features elements of the new global order as a whole in which considerations of economic growth and development have trumped every other concern, particularly democracy and social justice.

Much is being written about China’s new 'One Belt, One Road' initiative, but much of the writing focuses on China itself, on the destinations of the road – Europe and the Middle East – or on the countries through which the road passes, such as Central Asia. This book takes a different approach, assessing the views of East Asian and other countries on the Belt and Road Initiative, both from a transnational and multidisciplinary perspective. The book considers international visions and limitations of the New Silk Road as a new paradigm, explores economic and trade aspects, including infrastructure networks, financial mechanisms, and the likely impact for other countries and regions, and analyses the likely implications for regional and trans-regional cooperation and competition. Western and Asian regional perspectives on the New Silk Road, including from India, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and Japan are considered throughout the book.

China's Belt and Road strategy is acknowledged to be the most ambitious geopolitical initiative of the age. Covering almost seventy countries by land and sea, it will affect every element of global society, from shipping to agriculture, digital economy to tourism, politics to culture. Most importantly, it symbolizes a new phase in China's ambitions as a superpower: to remake the world economy and crown Beijing as the new center of capitalism and globalization. Bruno Maçães traces this extraordinary initiative's history, highlighting its achievements to date, and its staggering complexity. He asks whether Belt and Road is about more than power projection and profit. Might it herald a new set of universal political values, to rival those of the West? Is it, in fact, the story of the century?

This book explores China's place in the new international order, from both the international perspective, and from the perspective within China. It discusses how far the new international order, as viewed by the United States and with the United States seeing itself as the single dominant power, applies to China.

The Confucian doctrine of tianxia (all under heaven) outlines a unitary worldview that cherishes global justice and transcends social, geographic, and political divides. For contemporary scholars, it has held myriad meanings, from the articulation of a cultural imaginary and political strategy to a moralistic commitment and a cosmological vision. The contributors to Chinese Visions of World Order examine the evolution of tianxia's meaning and practice in the Han dynasty and its mutations in modern times. They attend to its varied interpretations, its relation to realpolitik, and its revival in twenty-first-century China. They also investigate tianxia's birth in antiquity and its role in empire building, invoke its cultural universalism as a new global imagination for the contemporary world, analyze its resonance and affinity with cosmopolitanism in East-West cultural relations, discover its persistence in China's socialist internationalism and third world agenda, and critique its deployment as an official state ideology. In so doing, they demonstrate how China draws on its past to further its own alternative vision of the current international system. Contributors. Daniel A. Bell, Chishen Chang, Kuan-Hsing Chen, Prasenjit Duara, Hsieh Mei-yu, Haiyan Lee, Mark Edward Lewis, Lin Chun, Viren Murthy, Lisa Rofel, Ban Wang, Wang Hui, Yiqun Zhou

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.