Chinese Civil Military Relations

This work provides an in-depth and up-to-date examination of civil-military relations in China. It reflects the significant changes taking place in Chinese society and their impact on the civil-military dynamic, with particular attention to how the military will fit in with the new class of entrepreneurs. Rather than focusing exclusively on elite Party-Army relations, the book examines civil-military relations from various vantage points: at "the center" and in the provinces; between civilian leaders and military leaders; from a strictly military perspective and from a civilian perspective; and from the angle of specific issue areas. Chapters explore issues, such as the impact of AIDS, the defense budget, the emerging dynamic between the military and China's new leadership, resettling demobilized troops back into civilian life, and the role of the militia, reserve units, and other civilian groups. The contributors are highly respected specialists in China studies, including political scientists, historians, PLA specialists, and sociologists. They present a vibrant portrait of the new civil-military dynamic in the PRC within the complex social changes that China is exploring today.

This new book addresses three key issues: What has changed in Chinese civil-military relations? What can account for changes? And what are the implications for Chinese security policy and strategic behaviour? It tackles these questions by sharply assessing civil-military dynamics in elite politics; such dynamics in national security and arms control policy; relations between commanders and political commissars; relations between the PLA and society; civil-military dynamics regarding defence economics and logistics; and such dynamics regarding dual-use technologies and defence industry. These analyses build into the central theme that the emphasis of Chinese civil-military relations is shifting from politics to military tasks. This is an extremely important new development by a nation many predict to become a super power in the twenty-first century. This is therefore essential reading for all students and scholars of strategic and security studies, Chinese studies and international relations.

Examines civil-military relations in China. Reflects the significant changes taking place in Chinese society and their impact on the civil-military dynamic, with particular attention to how the military will fit in with the new class of entrepreneurs.

This book demonstrates that civil-military relations have evolved away from symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in post-Deng Xiaoping China. As the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a Leninist party-army, it is commonly assumed that the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA is symbiotic and institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor are absent between the two. This symbiosis suggests that the primary role of the PLA is in China's domestic politics; it is to participate in intra-CCP leadership power struggle and in defending the CCP regime against popular rebellions from within Chinese society. By analyzing major changes in the functions of the PLA political commissar system, the extent of the PLA involvement in the power struggle of the CCP leadership, and the circulation of elites across civil-military institutional boundaries, this book offers a new theoretical explanation of civil-military relations in China. It also discusses the implications of the findings for China's domestic politics and foreign policy. Nan Li is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He has published extensively on Chinese security and military policy and China's maritime development. He was a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and received a PhD in political science from the Johns Hopkins University.

This study addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil-military relations during the post-Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. First, because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its primary function is domestic politics -- that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been employed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA's ground force, which is manpower-intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics -- such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force) -- have been more privileged in China's military modernization drive. This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. Second, China's civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. Finally, the PLAN was previously marginalized within the PLA ... By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more important in China's military policy.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT-- OVERSTOCK SALE-- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last China Maritime Studies No. 4. Addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil Military relations during the post-Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization? Why are these important? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. 1) First, because the People s Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its pri- mary function is domestic politics that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been em- ployed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA s ground force, which is manpower- intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force) have been more privileged in China s military modernization drive. This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. 2) Second, China s civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. 3) Finally, the PLAN (PLA Navy) was previously marginalized within the PLA, partly because the lat- ter was largely preoccupied with domestic issues and politics, where the PLAN is not especially useful. By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more impor- tant in China s military policy. Students participating in Chinese studies classroom assignments may be interested in this volume for research. This work may also be of interest to military and political science students as well as military historians, military strategists, and political science scholars. "

Modern studies of civil--military relations recognise that the military is separate from civil society, with its own norms and values, principles of organization, and regulations. Key issues of concern include the means by which – and the extent to which – the civil power controls the military; and also the ways in which military values and approaches permeate and affect wider society. This book examines these issues in relation to China, covering the full range of Chinese history from the Zhou, Qin, and Han dynasties up to the Communist takeover in 1949. It traces how civil--military relations were different in different periods, explores how military specialization and professionalization developed, and reveals how military weakness often occurred when the civil authority with weak policies exerted power over the military. Overall, the book shows how attitudes to the military’s role in present day Communist China were forged in earlier periods.

This study reviews the last 20 years of academic literature on the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Chinese elite politics. It examines the PLA's willingness to support the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and to obey directives from top party leaders, the PLA's influence on the selection of China's top civilian leaders, and the PLA's ability to shape the domestic political environment. Over the last two decades the discussion of these three issues has largely been shaped by five trends identified in the literature: increasing PLA professionalism, bifurcation of civil and military elites, a reduced PLA role in political institutions, reduced emphasis on political work within the PLA, and increased military budgets. Together, these trends are largely responsible for the markedly reduced role of the PLA in Chinese elite politics.