Chinese Civil Military Relations In The Post Deng Era

This study addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil-military relations during the post-Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. First, because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its primary function is domestic politics -- that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been employed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA's ground force, which is manpower-intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics -- such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force) -- have been more privileged in China's military modernization drive. This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. Second, China's civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. Finally, the PLAN was previously marginalized within the PLA ... By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more important in China's military policy.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT-- OVERSTOCK SALE-- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last China Maritime Studies No. 4. Addresses two analytical questions: What has changed in Chinese civil Military relations during the post-Deng Xiaoping era? What are the implications of this change for China's crisis management and its naval modernization? Why are these important? Addressing these questions is important for three major reasons. 1) First, because the People s Liberation Army (PLA) is a party army, it is commonly assumed that its pri- mary function is domestic politics that is, to participate in party leadership factional politics and to defend the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against political opposition from Chinese society. For the past twenty years, however, the PLA has not been em- ployed by such party leaders as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao against political opposition from either the CCP or Chinese society. The PLA s ground force, which is manpower- intensive and therefore the most appropriate service for domestic politics, has been continuously downsized. Technology and capital-intensive services that are appropriate for force projection to the margins of China and beyond and for strategic deterrence but are inappropriate for domestic politics such as the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery (the strategic missile force) have been more privileged in China s military modernization drive. This study, by examining change in Chinese civil-military relations, undertakes to resolve this analytical puzzle. 2) Second, China s civil-military interagency coordination in crisis management during the post-Deng era has remained an area of speculation, for lack of both information and careful analysis. By analyzing change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study aims to shed some light on this analytical puzzle as well. 3) Finally, the PLAN (PLA Navy) was previously marginalized within the PLA, partly because the lat- ter was largely preoccupied with domestic issues and politics, where the PLAN is not especially useful. By exploring change in Chinese civil-military relations, this study also attempts to explain why during the post-Deng era the PLAN has become more impor- tant in China s military policy. Students participating in Chinese studies classroom assignments may be interested in this volume for research. This work may also be of interest to military and political science students as well as military historians, military strategists, and political science scholars. "

This book demonstrates that civil-military relations have evolved beyond symbiosis to quasi-institutionalization in post-Deng Xiaoping China. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a Leninist party-army, it is commonly assumed that the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA is symbiotic and institutional boundaries based on a clear functional division of labor are absent between the two. This symbiosis suggests that the primary role of the PLA is in China’s domestic politics; it is to participate in intra-CCP leadership power struggle and in defending the CCP regime against popular rebellions from within Chinese society. By analyzing major changes in the functions of the PLA political commissar system, the extent of the PLA involvement in the power struggle of the CCP leadership, and the circulation of elites across civil-military institutional boundaries, this book offers a new theoretical explanation of civil-military relations in China. It also discusses the implications of the findings for China’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

This new book addresses three key issues: What has changed in Chinese civil-military relations? What can account for changes? And what are the implications for Chinese security policy and strategic behaviour? It tackles these questions by sharply assessing civil-military dynamics in elite politics; such dynamics in national security and arms control policy; relations between commanders and political commissars; relations between the PLA and society; civil-military dynamics regarding defence economics and logistics; and such dynamics regarding dual-use technologies and defence industry. These analyses build into the central theme that the emphasis of Chinese civil-military relations is shifting from politics to military tasks. This is an extremely important new development by a nation many predict to become a super power in the twenty-first century. This is therefore essential reading for all students and scholars of strategic and security studies, Chinese studies and international relations.

This work provides an in-depth and up-to-date examination of civil-military relations in China. It reflects the significant changes taking place in Chinese society and their impact on the civil-military dynamic, with particular attention to how the military will fit in with the new class of entrepreneurs. Rather than focusing exclusively on elite Party-Army relations, the book examines civil-military relations from various vantage points: at "the center" and in the provinces; between civilian leaders and military leaders; from a strictly military perspective and from a civilian perspective; and from the angle of specific issue areas. Chapters explore issues, such as the impact of AIDS, the defense budget, the emerging dynamic between the military and China's new leadership, resettling demobilized troops back into civilian life, and the role of the militia, reserve units, and other civilian groups. The contributors are highly respected specialists in China studies, including political scientists, historians, PLA specialists, and sociologists. They present a vibrant portrait of the new civil-military dynamic in the PRC within the complex social changes that China is exploring today.

In November 2002, the Chinese Communist Party held its 16th Congress and formally initiated a sweeping turnover of senior leaders in both the Party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The meeting heralded not merely a new set of personalities in positions of political and military power, but also the emergence of a new generation of leaders. Who are these individuals, and what does their rise mean for the future of China and its military? China matters to the United States because of its size, its spectacular patterns of growth, its profound problems linked to rapid growth, and its military intentions. Facts and trends are examined to explain the divisions and cohesions in the Chinese leadership and their potential significance to the United States and the rest of the world. Also examined is how Chinese policies have evolved over the years, and how important the United States has been in influencing China's strategy. What, for instance, will the emerging leadership with its factious differences do about Taiwan and North Korea?

This edited volume examines the recalibration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) roles and missions in China’s domestic and foreign policymaking since Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in late 2012. This book explores how China’s growing military prowess, along with Beijing’s ongoing shift away from "keeping a low profile," owes much to the policies of the China’s Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership. The chapters in the book share a central theme: the recalibration of the PLA roles and missions since Xi Jinping assumed the trifecta of party-state-military power. These contributions seek to explore in depth some of the key issues and scrutinize the enhancements in the PLA’s operational capabilities, both in terms of its hardware as well as its "heartware" – the human elements of its development such as operational culture and doctrine. In all, the chapters document the transformative change the PLA has undergone since the profound realization of its previous limitations vis-à-vis the United States’ advanced military operations of the previous century as well as pointing to continuity amid change. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Chinese politics, Asian security, defense studies, and international relations, in general.

Ellis Joffe has drawn on a lifetime of experience as an analyst of Chinese military affairs in this authoritative assessment of a highly elusive subject: military modernization and the politics of civilian-military relations in the post-Mao period. He has sifted vast amounts of evidence, primary and secondary, to show that during the past few years the Chinese army has been transformed into a relatively modern and professional force that will be the basis for future growth of Chinaâe(tm)s military power. The author begins by describing the development of the Peopleâe(tm)s Liberation Army in the Maoist era and explains the reasons for its decline. He analyzes the political changes and the shifts in strategic outlook of Maoâe(tm)s successors that have made possible a new policy of military modernization: a policy of raising the combat capability of the PLA through slow improvements of technologyâe"including buying some material abroadâe"and a thorough upgrading of the nontechnological components of military power. Joffe examines all aspects of the PLAâe(tm)s modernization, focusing on the wide-ranging changes in doctrine, weapons, organization, structure, and modes of operation, and concludes with an analysis of the PLAâe(tm)s political role and the state of civilâe"military relations. There is a particularly perspicacious chapter dissecting Dengâe(tm)s maneuvers to remove the military influence in politics that had burgeoned during and after the Cultural Revolution.