Civil Military Relations In International Interventions

This book examines military and civilian actors in international interventions and offers a new analytical framework to apply on such interventions. While it is frequently claimed that success in international interventions hinges largely on military–civilian coherence, cooperation has proven challenging to achieve in practice. This book examines why this is the case, by analysing various approaches employed by military and civilian actors and discussing the different relationships between the intervening actors and those upon whom they have intervened. The work analyses different military concepts, such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, and the often-troubled relationship between the humanitarian and military intervening actors. It presents a new analytical framework to examine these relationships based on identification theory, which illuminates how the interveners represent those they have been deployed to engage, as well as their own identity and role. As such the book offers an enhanced understanding of the challenges related to civil-military cooperation in international interventions, as well as a theoretical contribution to the study of interventions, more generally. This book will be of much interest to students of international interventions, military studies, peacekeeping, security studies and International Relations.

This book investigates the challenges related to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and offers a new perspective by examining the social role of NATO CIMIC soldiers. The intertwining of the civilian and military spheres has become a significant part of the contemporary security environment. However, the relationship between the military and civilian actors is often troubled, filled with misunderstandings and rivalry. In their duty to provide a link between the military and diverse civilian environment, soldiers involved in CIMIC are exposed to varied, often-conflicted expectations that make up their social role and put stress on their performance and the effectiveness of CIMIC. By drawing on analysis of NATO CIMIC documents and a series of interviews with CIMIC soldiers, the author is able to, first, identify the elements of the CIMIC role and, second, diagnose the inherent role conflict and describe methods of dealing with it. Looking at civil-military cooperation through this lens reveals new layers of challenges that impact its effectiveness and a better way to understand the complexity of civil-military interaction. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, military sociology, peacekeeping, security studies, and international relations, as well as military practitioners.

This book explores contemporary civil-military relations in the United States. Much of the canonical literature on civil-military relations was either written during or references the Cold War, while other major research focuses on the post-Cold War era, or the first decade of the twenty-first century. A great deal has changed since then. This book considers the implications for civil-military relations of many of these changes. Specifically, it focuses on factors such as breakdowns in democratic and civil-military norms and conventions; intensifying partisanship and deepening political divisions in American society; as well as new technology and the evolving character of armed conflict. Chapters are organized around the principal actors in civil-military relations, and the book includes sections on the military, civilian leadership, and the public. It explores the roles and obligations of each. The book also examines how changes in contemporary armed conflict influence civil-military relations. Chapters in this section examine the cyber domain, grey zone operations, asymmetric warfare and emerging technology. The book thus brings the study of civil-military relations into the contemporary era, in which new geopolitical realities and the changing character of armed conflict combine with domestic political tensions to test, if not potentially redefine, those relations.

Why did American leaders work hard to secure multilateral approval from the United Nations or NATO for military interventions in Haiti, the Balkans, and Libya, while making only limited efforts to gain such approval for the 2003 Iraq War? In Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia addresses this important question by drawing on declassified documents and about one hundred interviews with civilian and military leaders.The most assertive, hawkish, and influential civilian leaders, he argues, tend to downplay the costs of intervention, and when confronted with hesitant international partners they often want to bypass multilateral bodies. America's top-level generals, by contrast, are usually "reluctant warriors" who worry that intervention will result in open-ended stabilization missions; consequently, the military craves international burden sharing and values the potential exit ramp for U.S. forces that a handoff to the UN or NATO can provide.Recchia demonstrates that when the military speaks up and clearly expresses its concerns, even strongly pro-intervention civilian leaders can be expected to work hard to secure UN or NATO approval—if only to reassure the military about the likelihood of sustained burden sharing. Conversely, when the military stays silent, as it did in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, bellicose civilian leaders are empowered; the United States is then more likely to bypass multilateral bodies, and it may end up carrying a heavy stabilization burden largely by itself. Recchia's argument that the military has the ability to contribute not only to a more prudent but also to a more multilateralist U.S. intervention policy may be counterintuitive, but the evidence is compelling.

This book explores the impact of different civil-military structures on operational effectiveness in complex peace operations. Recent operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia are examples of grand failures to enforce peace and to promote democracy and development through international interventions. A missing variable in analyses of these conflicts hitherto has been the nature of the civil-military interface and its impact. The principal argument of this book is that the civil-military interface should ideally be integrated within the interagency arena as well as within the defence ministry. Such integration has the potential to provide joint civil-military planning and comprehensive approaches to operations. It also creates mutual trust and understanding amongst officers and civil servants from different departments, agencies and units, and thereby, a co-operative interagency culture. For the civil-military interface to function effectively within the chain of command during operations, a co-operative culture of trust is essential. Crucially, structurally and culturally integrated civil-military structures are likely to provide a more balanced view of the functional imperative of the armed forces. The results are armed forces fit for whatever purpose the political leadership decides for them - including complex peace support operations. Empirically, the book applies the theoretical framework to a comparative study of US and British patterns of civil-military relations, their strategic cultures and their operations in Iraq. This book will be of much interest to students of peace operations, civil-military relations, humanitarian intervention, and security studies/IR in general. Robert Egnell is a lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish National Defence College and a senior researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. He was awarded the 2008 Kenneth N. Waltz Dissertation Prize for the best thesis in the field of international security.

Bringing together leading scholars from across the world, this comprehensive Research Handbook analyses key problems, subjects, regions, and countries in civil-military relations. Showcasing cutting-edge research developments, it illustrates the deeply complex nature of the field and analyses important topics in need of renewed consideration.

Peacekeeping in the late 1990s is a complex and diverse task, in which civilian and military personnel are working together to a greater degree than ever before. However, when an international body such as the UN takes strategic decisions, it does so with inadequate input from the military; in the field, there are clashes of culture, confusion over command and control arrangements and insufficient operational coordination. These issues also affect regional organisations such as NATO. The awkward management of operations and their uneven level of achievement have contributed to a decline in the number of UN peacekeeping operations since 1994. This paper argues that the balance between civilian and military expertise and advice at all levels of a peacekeeping mission – strategic, tactical and operational – needs to be reappraised. At the strategic level: * mandates must be clear, and must respond both to the needs of the situation and to the resources available * there must be regular dialogue between all the principal players, military and civilian; the military-staff capacity at UN headquarters should be made more effective, and should be responsible to the Security Council * major troop-contributing countries should be systematically involved in determining mandates, as well as in reviewing operational plans * senior military officers from all large troop-contributing countries should be based at a mission’s field headquarters. At the operational level: * the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General – the head of a UN peacekeeping mission – should be strengthened. In non-UN operations, the authority of the High Representative needs to be increased * a cadre of civilian officials with peacekeeping experience needs to be developed; standard operating procedures for the civilian head of a mission to follow when dealing with the military need to be developed * greater emphasis should be placed on the ‘softer’ aspects of military science – managing resources, civilian control and human rights * the reluctance of civilians and non-governmental organisations to engage with the military should be addressed. Much experience has been gained from the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, but both military and civilian participants must make considerably more progress before they can be said to have forged a partnership that makes them an effective intervention force