Coalition Country

"The ANC has governed South Africa for more than two decades but its iron grip is slipping. For the first time since 1994 there is no guarantee that it will retain power. If ANC support drops below 50% in the 2019 elections, the political landscape will be tranmsformed dramatically : we will be governed by a coalition, and the consequences will be felt by everyone." From the book cover.

From Austria to New Zealand, coalition governments often pave the road to foreign policy. In Western Europe, nearly 90 percent of postwar governments include two or more political parties. Israel, the Middle East’s only consolidated democracy according to many, has never experienced single-party rule in its history. Even the United Kingdom, known for its long streak of single-party rule, now navigates multiparty cabinets. Coalitions are everywhere, but we still have little understanding of how they act in foreign affairs. History shows that coalitions can sometime engage in powerful international commitments such as participating in military operations, but at other times, they postpone their decisions, water down their policy positions, or promise to do less than they otherwise would. What explains these differences in behavior? Governing Abroad unpacks the little-known world of coalition governments to find out. Oktay argues that the specific constellation of parties in government explains why some coalitions can make more assertive foreign policy decisions than others. Building on the rich literature in political science on coalitions, legislatures, and voting behavior, the book weaves together sophisticated statistical analyses of foreign policy events across thirty European countries alongside in-depth case studies from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland. It brings political parties back into the study of foreign policy, demonstrating that the size of the coalition, the ideological proximity of the governing parties, and their relationship with the parliamentary opposition together influence the government’s ability to act in the international arena. This book challenges our existing perceptions about the constraints and weaknesses of coalition governments. It sheds new light on the conditions that allow them to act decisively abroad.

Through examination of parliamentary governments in twelve countries, this book demonstrates the ways in which study of the parties in governing coalitions, and their parliamentary opposition, provides insight into numerous aspects of countries' cultural values, societal schisms, and the issues of greatest contention among their people. Each chapter analyses the political parties in a different country's parliament and illustrates how they represent the country's competing interests, social divisions, and public policy debates. Coalition and opposition parties are also shown to reflect each country's: political institutions; political actors; political culture; and societal, geographic, and ideological rifts. In many of the countries, changes in the constellation of parties in government are emblematic of important political, social, and economic changes. This book will be essential reading for students of parliamentary government, political parties, electoral politics, and, more broadly, comparative politics.

Cook's principles of coalition politics are really rules of thumb followed by boundedly rational actors, and can predict much coalition politics behavior. Agents prefer to create marginally winning coalitions with like-minded groups in the expectation of receiving rewards commensurate with investments. Four distinct types of coalitions--country, regime, agenda, and cabinet--are explored, along with a thorough examination of current coalition literature. Normally nested, the broader coalitions give rise to narrower ones, revealing diminishing bases of support and duration. Also, barring political catastrophe, change in coalitions at the program or cabinet level usually do not harm, and may actually strengthen, the regime or country coalitions from which they arise. Students and scholars in comparative politics and political theory will benefit from Cook's ability to rise above the usual divisions and limitations of sub-fields. A distinctive and refreshing mix of theory and empirical material, ^INested Political Coalitions^R provides a sensible digest of diverse theoretical literatures, a good overview of coalition dynamics from one level to the next, and illustrates all this with breathtaking empirical coverage.

Through examination of parliamentary governments in twelve countries, this book demonstrates the ways in which study of the parties in governing coalitions, and their parliamentary opposition, provides insight into numerous aspects of countries’ cultural values, societal schisms, and the issues of greatest contention among their people. Each chapter analyses the political parties in a different country’s parliament and illustrates how they represent the country’s competing interests, social divisions, and public policy debates. Coalition and opposition parties are also shown to reflect each country’s: political institutions; political actors; political culture; and societal, geographic, and ideological rifts. In many of the countries, changes in the constellation of parties in government are emblematic of important political, social, and economic changes. This book will be essential reading for students of parliamentary government, political parties, electoral politics, and, more broadly, comparative politics.

This book analyzes the much-needed and vastly under-studied subject of bargaining coalitions of developing countries in the GATT and WTO. This is an extremely important contribution to the field.

Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.

Africa's long-ruling incumbents stay in power because opposition politicians struggle to secure the finances required to build electoral coalitions.