Coalitions Of The Weak

An exhaustively researched account of late-Mao power strategy and its consequences on elite dynamics in subsequent decades, including the rise of Xi.

Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.

A comprehensive view of coalition formation is presented here. Each of the chapters gives a summary of theories and research findings in a specific field of interest, at various levels of human and primate organisation.

This book presents an account of war settlement in Georgia and Tajikistan as local actors maneuvered in the shadow of a Russian-led military intervention. Combining ethnography and game theory and quantitative and qualitative methods, this book presents a revisionist account of the post-Soviet wars and their settlement.

This book analyzes the much-needed and vastly under-studied subject of bargaining coalitions of developing countries in the GATT and WTO. This is an extremely important contribution to the field.

This book studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies.

Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

Argues that in coalition governments, the norm in most parliamentary democracies, strong legislative institutions play a critical role in allowing parties to deal with the electoral competition and the necessity of delegating authority to ministers affiliated with specific parties which threaten compromise agreements.